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I. TITLE PROBLEMS
A. Ownership and Boundary Disputes
1. Adverse Possession. Acquisition of title by adverse possession' con-
tinued to be one of the most litigated issues2 during the 1979 survey year.
In order to establish title to real estate by adverse possession, the claimant
must show that he or his predecessors-in-interest 3 have been in exclusive, 4
1. The terms adverse possession and prescription, although sometimes used inter-
changeably, are technically distinct. Adverse possession functions as a method of transfer-
ring fee simple title to a possessor, without the consent of the prior owner, after a statutory
period set by a state legislature beyond which the prior owner cannot bring an action to
recover his land. 7 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 709-10 (1979). Prescription is
the acquisition of incorporeal hereditaments, such as access easements, by the long contin-
ued use thereof by the claimant or his predecessors-in-interest for a time fixed by law.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1064-65 (5th ed. 1979).
2. For earlier cases on adverse possession, see Heath & Bentley, Real Property, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 31, 32-33 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Heath & Bentley
(1979)]; Heath & Bentley, Real Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 27, 29-31
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Heath & Bentley (1978)].
3. See, e.g., Hutto v. Cook, 139 Tex. 571, 164 S.W.2d 513 (1942).
4. Although the possession may be constructive or actual, Dawson v. Tumlinson, 150
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visible and notorious, 5 continuous and peaceable,6 hostile and adverse 7
possession for the statutorily prescribed period of time.8 All of the forego-
ing elements must be supported by the evidence and found by the trier-of-
fact before the claimant may acquire title by adverse possession. 9
The realty in question need not be in the possession of claimant person-
ally for the statutorily prescribed period of time.' 0 The period of limita-
tions runs against the real owner's "long want of possession," rather than a
possessor's long "having" of possession. " I The ability of a claimant to util-
ize the possession of another to establish the necessary time period for ac-
quiring title by adverse possession is commonly referred to as "tacking.' ' 2
Two cases decided within this year's survey period illustrate some of the
complexities of tacking. Short v. Lyness' 3 involved a claim of title by ad-
verse possession under article 551014 and 551615 to a disputed .149-acre
tract. Plaintiffs claimed title to the disputed tract by purchase from a prior
possessor, Collins, who had enclosed the disputed acreage by fence line
thirty-eight years before the filing of the trespass to try title action. Plain-
tiffs' deed from Collins described the property by calls of "[fence] post to
[fence] post."'1 6 The privity 17 by deed between plaintiffs and Collins was
Tex. 451, 457, 242 S.W.2d 191, 195 (1951), it must be exclusive of the true landowner. See,
e.g., Southern Pine Lumber Co. v. Hart, 161 Tex. 357, 366, 340 S.W.2d 775, 782 (1960).
5. See, e.g., West Prod. Co. v. Kahanek, 132 Tex. 153, 158, 121 S.W.2d 328, 331 (1938).
6. See, e.g., Simonds v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 134 Tex. 332, 340, 114 S.W.2d 226,
232 (1938).
7. See, e.g., Chance v. Branch, 58 Tex. 490, 492-93 (1883).
8. See, e.g., Kirby Lumber Co. v. Conn, 114 Tex. 104, 110, 263 S.W. 902, 903 (1924).
Texas has several limitations statutes that vest title to lands by adverse possession. TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5507, 5509-10, 5518-19, 5519a (Vernon 1958). Article 5507 re-
quires that the adverse possessor be in possession under title or color of title for a period of
time in excess of three years. Under article 5509, the five-year statute, the claimant must
prove possession under a deed or deeds duly registered, payment of property taxes, and
cultivation. Article 5510 requires that the adverse possessor show cultivation, use or enjoy-
ment for ten years, and some written memorandum of title if the possessor claims more than
160 acres. Article 5518, one of the three 25-year statutes, bars suit by a record owner despite
the presence of legal disabilities, such as age, mental incapacity, or military service, if not
commenced within 25 years after the cause of action has accrued. Article 5519, a second 25-
year statute, bestows good and marketable title on a good faith adverse possessor under a
claim of right, such as a recorded deed or similar instrument, after such a period. Article
5519a, the third 25-year statute, is unique in that it provides the adverse claimant with only a
rebuttable prima facie case. Under it, the adverse claimant is required to show that he has
exercised dominion over the land and paid all property taxes on the land for 25 years and
that the record owner has failed to exercise dominion or pay taxes in at least one of the prior
25 years. See generally Larson, Limitations on Actionsfor Real Property the Texas Five- Year
Statute, 18 Sw. L.J. 385 (1964); Larson, Texas Limitations, the Twenty-Five Year Statutes, 15
Sw. L.J. 177 (1961); Note, Adverse Possession.- The Three, Five, and Ten Year Statutes of
Limitation, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 78 (1975).
9. See Pearson v. Doherty, 143 Tex. 64, 71, 183 S.W.2d 453, 456 (1944).
10. See, e.g., Hutto v. Cook, 139 Tex. 571, 164 S.W.2d 513 (1942).
1!. 7 R. POWELL, supra note 1, at 756.
12. Id.
13. 572 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
14. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5510 (Vernon 1958).
15. Article 5516 provides: "Peaceable and adverse possession need not be continued in
the same person, but when held by different persons successively there must be privity of
estate between them. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5516 (Vernon 1958).
16. 572 S.W.2d at 117.
17. "Privity of estate ... is shown under the following circumstances: 'Privity of pos-
1980]
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held sufficient to allow plaintiffs to tack the period of their adverse posses-
sion of the disputed acreage to that of their grantor Collins.'
8
The plaintiff in Dale v. Stringer, 9 however, was not as successful in her
attempt to tack the possessory period of a prior adverse possessor under
the ten-year statute of limitations. 20 Plaintiffs predecessors had been in
actual possession of the disputed tract for more than ten years before mak-
ing a conveyance to plaintiff2' that did not describe the disputed 3.949-acre
tract,22 although the disputed tract was enclosed by the perimeters of a
fence surrounding a second tract that was described. Plaintiffs subsequent
possession of the disputed tract was for a period of nine years only.2 3 The
court of civil appeals stated that, to be successful, plaintiff must meet all
the requirements for establishing privity between herself and her predeces-
sors, which the court described as follows: (1) the possession and claim of
the claimant's predecessors must meet all the requirements of the applica-
ble limitation statute; (2) the possession and claim of the claimant and of
his predecessors must be continuous without interruption; and (3) the
claimant must have acquired the earlier occupant's possession and claim
by agreement, gift, devise, or inheritance. 24 Although the plaintiff had suc-
cessfully established the first two elements of privity required for tacking,
her claim of title by adverse possession was unsuccessful because tacking is
not possible when a title by limitation has matured before transfer unless
the matured title is conveyed in writing.25 Thus, the court in Dale held
that plaintiff was not entitled to tack the possession of her predecessors,
because the deed to plaintiff did not describe the disputed acreage.26 Al-
though plaintiff presented evidence that her immediate predecessor com-
municated to her orally that he was conveying to her the disputed acreage
as well as the second tract, an oral conveyance of a matured title is insuffi-
cient under the Statute of Frauds. 27 Plaintiff therefore failed to establish
her own title, although, presumably, valid title to the disputed tract re-
mained in the prior adverse possessors.
To establish title by adverse possession, the claimant's possession for the
statutory period must be of sufficient character to be open, visible, and
notorious; 28 that is, such possession must be sufficient to place the record
session between successive occupants or possessors is shown to have existed ... by proof
that the earlier occupant's possession and claim passed or was transferred to the later occu-
pant by agreement, gift, devise or inheritance.'" Hutto v. Cook, 139 Tex. 571, 575, 164
S.W.2d 513, 515 (1942).
18. 572 S.W.2d at 120.
19. 570 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
20. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5510 (Vernon 1958).
21. 570 S.W.2d at 417.
22. Id. at 416.
23. Id.
24. Id. (citing Hutto v. Cook, 139 Tex. 571, 164 S.W.2d 513 (1942); McAnally v. Texas
Co., 124 Tex. 196, 76 S.W.2d 997 (1934)).
25. 570 S.W.2d at 418.
26. Id.
27. Id.; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
28. The adverse possessor's actions upon the land must be sufficient to give the owner
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owner of the land on notice and enable him to take remedial action with
reasonable promptness. 29 The openness of the possession becomes ex-
tremely important when the land involved is not capable of day-to-day
use. 30 Thus, in Boettcher v. Gould3' the court held that a claim to title by
adverse possession was insufficient for lack of open, visible, and notorious
possession because appellees were unable to show that they were responsi-
ble for building a fence enclosing the disputed property 32 or that they had
vocally declared their claim to the acreage in question.33 The payment of
taxes, together with the occasional grazing of sheep and cattle, may in
some circumstances be insufficient to constitute an open and visible posses-
sion of disputed lands, as the unsuccessful plaintiffs in Wilder v. First Mort-
gage34 learned. In Short v. Lyness,35 however, continuous use of the
disputed land by the adverse possessors for grazing cattle, raising chickens,
and as a yard for their rural home was held to be sufficiently open in light
of the nature and location of the disputed acreage. In Ramirez v. Wood36
the distinction between the claims of successful and unsuccessful adverse
possessors turned on the issue of the openness of possession. A claimant
who had used the disputed tract for the grazing of cattle was unsuccessful;
whereas another claimant who had lived upon, fenced, and actually culti-
vated another disputed tract for fifty-five years was victorious.37 With re-
spect to the first claimant, the court stated that if an adverse possessor
relies upon the grazing of cattle upon a disputed tract in a claim for title by
adverse possession, he must show that such land was designedly enclosed
for such grazing in order for the grazing to be considered a visible and
open possession of the land.38
A claimant under an adverse possession statute must also be able to
prove that his possession has been continuous for the statutorily prescribed
period. 39 If the claimant's possession is intermittent in nature, the record
owner is deemed to be in possession of the disputed land during the breaks
in claimant's possession, and the statute of limitations runs anew from
reasonable notice of the claim. See, e.g., Orsborn v. Deep Rock Oil Corp., 153 Tex. 281,
288, 267 S.W.2d 781, 785-86 (1954).
29. 7 R. POWELL, supra note 1, at 713.
30. See, e.g., Nona Mills Co. v. Wright, 101 Tex. 14, 23-24, 102 S.W. 1118, 1121-22
(1907).
31. 577 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.).
32. Id. at 808. Appellee offered to testify that the fence in question was built at least 45
years before trial. However, since appellee was only two years old at that time, this testi-
mony was inadmissible hearsay. See Southern Pine Lumber Co. v. Hart, 161 Tex. 357, 340
S.W.2d 775 (1960).
33. 577 S.W.2d at 808.
34. 577 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ).
35. 572 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
36. 577 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).
37. Id. at 288.
38. Id. (citing McDonnold v. Weinacht, 465 S.W.2d 136, 141-42 (Tex. 1971); Orsborn v.
Deep Rock Oil Corp., 153 Tex. 281, 267 S.W.2d 781 (1954)). But see Short v. Lyness, 572
S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ), in which the court stated that enclosure
was not essential to establish adverse possession by grazing. Id. at 119.
39. See, e.g., Humphries v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 393 F.2d 69, 72-73 (5th Cir. 1968).
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each reentry of the property by the adverse claimant.4 0 Thus, in Grayson v.
Dunn41 plaintiffs' claim of title under the ten-year statute failed because of
their recurrent abandonment of the property.42 The Grayson court empha-
sized that if an adverse possessor has temporarily vacated the realty, he
must be prepared to show that the duration of the vacancy is reasonable
under the circumstances and that, by vacating the property, he did not
intend to abandon his claim thereto.4 3
The additional requirement that the adverse claimant's possession be
adverse and hostile is based upon the premise that the adverse possessor's
actions must be sufficiently inconsistent with the owner's rights and title to
place the record owner on notice of a violation of his property rights.44 In
Trevino v. Munoz,45 however, it was pointed out that for a record owner to
rely upon an adverse possessor's recognition of the owner's title, such rec-
ognition must occur before title by adverse possession has ripened.
46
In order to defeat the true owner's claim, an adverse possessor must be
able to prove that the applicable statutory limitation period has run.
4 7
Thus, a focal point in any adverse possession case is the determination of
the time when the statutory limitations period commenced.4 8 In Francis v.
Stanley49 defendants relied upon the ten-year statute5° in an unsuccessful
attempt to prove title by adverse possession. An earlier record predeces-
sor-in-interest of plaintiff had died intestate, at which time a portion of his
title had vested in his minor child. The court pointed out that the statute
of limitations does not begin to run against the claims of minors until they
have attained majority.5 '
Once the period of limitations has commenced, the adverse possession
must run for the entire statutorily prescribed period.52 One method of toll-
ing the limitations period is by filing an action against the adverse posses-
sor.53 In Republic National Bank v. Rogers54 the statutory limitation
period was halted upon commencement of a federal action by the record
owner, even though the action was dismissed by the federal court for lack
40. See, e.g., Dunn v. Taylor, 102 Tex. 80, 113 S.W. 265 (1908).
41. 581 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
42. Id. at 789.
43. Id. at 788 (citing Dunn v. Taylor, 102 Tex. 80, 85, 113 S.W. 265, 267 (1908); Hardy
v. Bumpstead, 41 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, judgmt adopted)).
44. See, e.g., Satterwhite v. Rosser, 61 Tex. 166, 171 (1884); 7 R. POWELL, supra note 1,
at 722-23.
45. 583 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ).
46. Id. at 843-44.
47. See, e.g., Kirby Lumber Co. v. Conn, 114 Tex. 104, 111-12, 263 S.W. 902, 904
(1924).
48. See, e.g., Portis v. Hill, 30 Tex. 530 (1868).
49. 574 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, no writ).
50. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5510 (Vernon 1958).
51. 574 S.W.2d at 634 (citing Hays v. Hinkle, 193 S.W. 153 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1917, writ ref d)).
52. See, e.g., Kirby Lumber Co. v. Conn, 114 Tex. 104, 111-12, 263 S.W. 902, 904
(1924).
53. See, e.g., Portis v. Hill, 30 Tex. 530 (1868); Francis v. Stanley, 574 S.W.2d 629 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, no writ).
54. 575 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
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of jurisdiction. The court determined that the action was sufficiently ad-
verse to come within the meaning of article 55145.5 because plaintiffs'
pleadings included every count essential to a trespass to try title action.
56
This tolling was effective even though plaintiffs had failed to ask the fed-
eral court for title to the disputed tract because that prayer could be added
by amendment.57 The court also noted that the plaintiff had initiated a
state court trespass to try title action against defendants pursuant to article
5539a 58 within sixty days after the dismissal of the federal suit.
5 9
The statutory limitations period may be based not only upon state law
but also upon federal law in actions involving land in which the federal
government or agencies thereof have an interest or claim.60 In Hart v.
United States61 two sets of litigants brought actions to reform and cancel
conveyances made to the United States. Both conveyances were made
twelve years prior to the filing of their respective actions. The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that under the Federal Quiet Title Act 62 both ac-
tions were barred.63
2. Boundary Disputes. Texas courts have long made a distinction be-
tween an actual action of trespass to try title and an action in the nature of
trespass to try title.64 Most disputes involving actual title to realty, such as
adverse possession actions, are brought as trespass to try title actions.
65
Although a boundary dispute may be tried as a trespass to try title action,
most are litigated as actions in the nature of trespass to try title.66 A liti-
gant in an action in the nature of trespass to try title is not required to
show that title to the land is vested in him as against all the world as he
would be in a trespass to try title action, but only that his claim to the land
is superior to that of the adverse party.67 Thus, as recognized in Plata v.
55. Article 5514 provides: "'Peaceable possession' is such as is continuous and not in-
terrupted by adverse suit to recover the estate." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5514
(Vernon 1958).
56. 575 S.W.2d at 647.
57. Id.
58. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5539a (Vernon 1958) provides:
When an action shall be dismissed in any way. . . because of a want of juris-
diction. . . and within sixty (60) days after such dismissal. . . such an action
shall be commenced in a Court of Proper Jurisdiction, the period between the
date of first filing and that of commencement in the second Court shall not be
counted as part of the period of limitation.
59. 575 S.W.2d at 645.
60. See, e.g., Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U.S. 255 (1896).
61. 585 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1978).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(f) (1976) provides: "Any civil action under this section shall be
barred unless it is commenced within twelve years of the date upon which it accrued."
63. 585 F.2d at 1285.
64. See, e.g., Brown v. Eubank, 378 S.W.2d 707, 711 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1964, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Lee v. Grupe, 223 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1949, no writ).
65. See, e.g., Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. State, 136 Tex. 5, 133 S.W.2d 767 (1939).
66. See, e.g., Hayes v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 62 Tex. 397 (1884).
67. Rocha v. Campos, 574 S.W.2d 233, 235-36 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978,
no writ). See also Brown v. Eubank, 378 S.W.2d 707, 711 (Tex.-Civ. App.-Tyler 1964, writ
refd n.r.e.); Lee v. Grupe, 223 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1949, no writ).
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Guzman,68 a plaintiff in a boundary dispute is required to show the loca-
tion of the claimed boundary by a preponderance of the evidence, but
need not prove clear title from the sovereign or from a common source.
69
As emphasized in Rocha v. Cam0os,7 ° however, the plaintiff in a boundary
suit must show that he has some claim of right to the disputed land, and
that claim must be manifested by declaration or by open or visible act.
71
Many boundary disputes involve careless or imprecise legal descrip-
tions.72 In Meyer v. Worden73 plaintiffs brought an action of trespass to try
title to 1.3 acres of land that they claimed by adverse possession and accre-
tion. The disputed acreage was not included in the expressed acreage call
of either plaintiffs' or defendants' lands as set forth in the judgment ren-
dered in a prior action between the parties covering the same disputed
lands.74 The disputed acreage adjoined the Brazos River, and the earlier
judgment awarded defendants title to land described in part by a course
and distance call of "along the meander line" of the Brazos River.75 The
reviewing court held that such language established title in defendant to
not only the land described by the express direction and distance calls, but
all land to the bank of the river and along the river's general course as
well.76 The court further noted that the call for acreage is the "least relia-
ble of all calls" and "cannot control the rest of the description unless there
is an express covenant in the deed that the acreage mentioned is the only
land conveyed."'77 Thus, the plaintiffs' claim of adverse possession failed
because of res judicata. Plaintiffs' claim of title by accretion failed as well
because of lack of proof that the disputed acreage was not in existence at
the time of the earlier action.78
In Maxfield v. Northwood Homes, Inc. 79 a dispute over the ownership of
a 16.6-foot strip of land adjoining the litigants' tracts arose because an
express direction and distance description in a deed from appellee to ap-
pellant placed the boundary of appellant's tract as 16.6 feet south of appel-
lee's tract, but the deed also described the boundary line as "passing
along" the northern edge of appellee's tract.80 Rejecting the trial court's
holding that the phrase "passing along" meant "parallel to," the Dallas
68. 571 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
69. Id. at 412.
70. 574 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).
71. Id. at 237.
72. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 151 Tex. 418, 420-21, 252 S.W.2d
149, 150 (1952).
73. 575 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
74. Id. at 369. The appellate court opinion in the earlier action is styled Meyer v.
Worden, 530 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1975, writ reed n.r.e.).
75. 575 S.W.2d at 369.
76. Id. (citing Hejl v. Wirth, 161 Tex. 609, 613, 343 S.W.2d 226, 228 (1961)).
77. 575 S.W.2d at 369 (quoting Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Masterson, 160 Tex. 548,
552, 334 S.W.2d 436, 439 (1960)).
78. 575 S.W.2d at 369-70.
79. 582 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.).
80. Id. at 589. The dispute arose over the following description: "THENCE South 89
degrees 15 minutes 29 seconds West 1548.16 feet passing along the North line of the Jack G.S.
Maxfield 5 acre tract to a point for comer in said present East line of Scott Mill Road." Id.
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court of civil appeals held that the words "passing along" created an ad-
joinder requiring the land to be measured contiguous to the north bound-
ary line of appellee's adjacent tract.8' The court pointed out that an
adjoinder is the equivalent of an artificial monument and controls a call
for course and distance.82
One of the issues in Plata v. Guzman8 3 involved an imprecise description
of the disputed land in the trial court's judgment.84 Appellants argued that
the description in the judgment rendered for appellee was too uncertain to
allow a writ of possession to issue. The Plata court stated that the test of
sufficiency of a legal description in a judgment to support a writ of posses-
sion is whether such description is sufficiently precise to permit an officer
charged with the duty of executing such writ to go upon the ground and,
without exercising a judicial function, ascertain the locality of the land as
fixed by the judgment.85 The court applied this test liberally and held that
the description was sufficient because the evidence adduced at trial showed
that a surveyor was capable of accurately drawing such description on a
plat and staking it out on the ground.86
3. Problems of Recordation and Miscellaneous Claims of Title. In estab-
lishing record title to land, a litigant is often faced with seemingly insur-
mountable problems such as gaps in his chain of title or constructive notice
of adverse claims of others.87 The law, however, sometimes supplies the
missing links of a litigant's claim88 or insulates him from the adverse
claims of others.89
To supply a gap in a chain of record title, an ancient conveyance may be
presumed. 90 In Howland v. Hough9t the Texas Supreme Court allowed the
appellant in a trespass to try title action to rely upon the presumption of a
lost grant as a matter of law.92 The court in Howland pointed out that
although the gap in title covered a thirty-three year period from 1845-1878,
following that period the appellant's record chain was unbroken, no ad-
verse claim had been made by any purported heirs or assigns of the origi-
81. Id. at 590.
82. Id. (citing Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. State, 129 Tex. 547, 101 S.W.2d 801 (1937)).
83. 571 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1978, writ refd n.r.e.); see text
accompanying note 68 supra.
84. 571 S.W.2d at 411-12. The judgment described the property as "[tihe north 10 acres
and the north 16-1/2 feet of the south 15 acres of the north 25 acres of Block 296, San Benito
Irrigation Company Subdivision in Cameron County, Texas." Id.
85. Id. (citing Brown v. Eubank, 378 S.W.2d 707, 714 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1964, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)).
86. 571 S.W.2d at 412.
87. See, e.g., Leonard v. Benford Lumber Co., 110 Tex. 83, 86-87, 216 S.W. 382, 383
(1919).
88. See, e.g., Francis v. Stanley, 574 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, no
writ).
89. See, e.g., Magee v. Paul, 110 Tex. 470, 478, 221 S.W. 254, 257 (1920).
90. Brewer v. Cochran, 99 S.W. 1033, 1035-36 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1907, writ
ref d).
91. 570 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. 1978).
92. Id. at 879-80.
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nal patentee, and appellant's claim was sufficiently evidenced by acts of
sale and conveyance and tax payments.93 These circumstances were held
sufficient as a matter of law to establish that the original patentee had con-
veyed the land to appellant's predecessors-in-interest. 94 In supplying a
chain of record title, a litigant may have to rely, however, upon the actual
production of ancient instruments. 95 In Zobel v. Slim96 the Texas
Supreme Court held that an 1894 judgment was admissible under the an-
cient documents exception to the hearsay rule for purposes of establishing
a chain of title.97
Howland v. Hough also represents a classic example of the court's ability
to correct an erroneous description. 98 Appellant's chain of title contained
four errors in the legal description that, if literally followed, included land
outside an original survey of the property involved in the lawsuit. The
Texas Supreme Court, relying upon the doctrine of evident mistake, cor-
rected the description to correlate the deed description with the survey.99
Disputes often arise between claimants under two separate chains of ti-
tle.' 00 In Jones v. Ford'0' the successful party's title emanated from a deed
of trust lien that ripened to fee title by quitclaim conveyance from the
mortgagor in satisfaction of the secured indebtedness. The unsuccessful
party's claim derived from a sheriffs deed acquired in satisfaction of a
judgment against the mortgagor and recorded subsequent to the deed of
trust but prior to the quitclaim conveyance. A central issue in Jones was
whether the applicable statute of limitations 10 2 barred a claim under the
deed of trust lien because the statutory period had elapsed between the
date of the note that the deed of trust lien secured and the initiation of the
suit.' 0 3 The court held that the limitations statute did not bar the suit be-
cause the quitclaim conveyance had foreclosed the deed of trust lien before
limitations had run, 104 effectively extinguishing appellant's judgment lien
and sheriffs deed.105
In Morris v. Reaves'0 6 appellants alleged that they were without notice
of appellees' claim and claimed the protection afforded by the recording
statute 0 7 to bona fide purchasers. A default judgment in favor of appellee
93. Id. at 879 (citing Brewer v. Cochran, 99 S.W. 1033 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1907, writ refd)).
94. 570 S.W.2d at 879.
95. See, e.g., Magee v. Paul, 110 Tex. 470, 477-80, 221 S.W. 254, 256-57 (1920).
96. 576 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1978), rev'g 522 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977).
97. 576 S.W.2d at 365.
98. 570 S.W.2d at 880-83.
99. Id. at 883.
100. See Zobel v. Slim, 576 S.W.2d 362, 363-64 (Tex. 1978).
101. 583 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.).
102. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5520 (Vernon 1958) provides that all actions for
recovery of real estate by virtue of any deed of trust lien on real estate shall be instituted
within four years after the cause of action shall have accrued.
103. 583 S.W.2d at 822.
104. Id. at 823.
105. Id.
106. 580 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
107. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6627 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
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had been rendered against appellants' predecessor in record title in a
county other than that in which the land was located, and an abstract of
such judgment was later properly recorded in the records of the county in
which the land was located. Four months after the judgment lien was re-
corded, an order setting aside the default judgment was entered by the
same district court, and this order was also filed in the real property
records of the county in which the land was located. The judgment debtor
then conveyed the land to one of the appellants. Subsequently, the order
vacating the default judgment was declared void for lack of jurisdiction.
Appellants contended that they were without notice of the invalidty of the
order and were entitled to rely on its apparent validity under the recording
act. The court, however, held that appellants were conclusively presumed
to have actual notice of the rule of civil procedure that voided the order,
raising a duty to inquire into the rule's effect on the order.
0 8
The deed records often fail to disclose the true owners of real property
because persons may fail properly to document and record events such as
births, changes in marital status, and deaths. 0 9 Such events have impor-
tant consequences on the ownership of real property and create complex
problems for abstract examiners, attorneys, and title companies. Stradt v.
First United Methodist Church 10 involved a dispute between the daughter
of decedent Wilson's first wife and a charitable beneficiary of Wilson. The
daughter claimed title to one-fourth of the disputed tract by intestate suc-
cession through Wilson's first wife, contending that the land was the com-
munity property of her parents at the time of her mother's death. The
church claimed title to the entire tract by virtue of a deed from Wilson and
the doctrine of parol partition. The church's contention that parol parti-
tion had occurred was based on the following facts: (1) at the time of Wil-
son's first wife's death, the disputed tract was part of a larger community
estate consisting of some 2,100 acres; (2) thirty-four years thereafter, Wil-
son conveyed approximately 1,600 acres out of the 2,100 acres of land to
the daughter and her brother "for love and affection" and for no other
stated consideration; (3) three years after such conveyances, the disputed
177 acres was conveyed by Wilson to the church; and (4) such conveyance
purported to convey full title. The Texas Supreme Court held that the
daughter's acceptance of the conveyance of the 1,600 acres from her father
was not sufficient to establish that such conveyance was in fact a parol
partition, because the church had failed to offer at trial any probative evi-
dence that she had accepted the conveyance in satisfaction of her claims to
her mother's estate. I
In Faglie v. Williams" 2 appellant brought a trespass to try title action
against her children and their assigns. Appellant's claims to the land in-
volved were based upon her purported marriage to her children's natural
108. 580 S.W.2d at 893; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(5).
109. See generally 7 R. POWELL, supra note 1, at 631-708.
110. 573 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. 1978).
111. Id. at 190.
112. 569 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
1980]
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
father at the time the disputed tracts were acquired. Prior to acquisition of
the land, appellant had obtained an allegedly void divorce decree against
the children's father and, although still living with him, had entered into a
ceremonial marriage with another man. Shortly thereafter, title to the dis-
puted tract was acquired in the name of her "divorced" husband.
The court in Faglie held that appellant could not attack the validity of
the divorce decree on the basis of lack of jurisdiction because she had in-
voked the jurisdiction of the court to obtain the decree.' 13 Appellant's sec-
ond contention that after the divorce a common law marriage was
immediately established failed primarily because of her subsequent cere-
monial marriage to another.' 14 Consequently, appellant had no commu-
nity property interest in the disputed land.
In Moran v. Adler115 the Texas Supreme Court discussed the conse-
quences on real property ownership of equitable adoption. 16 Plaintiffs
brought an action seeking to establish that their deceased stepmother had
equitably adopted them prior to her death and that, by virtue of such
adoption, they succeeded to her community interest in realty acquired dur-
ing her marriage to their father. Defendant had purchased the land at a
foreclosure sale under the terms of a deed of trust given by the plaintiffs'
father after their stepmother's death. The Texas Supreme Court held that
the mortgagee and defendant-purchaser were entitled to the protection of
the recording statute as bona fide purchasers without notice of plaintiffs'
claims of equitable title, and such equitable title was therefore cut off by
the foreclosure of the deed of trust lien." 7
In Collora v. Navarro"18 equitable title 119 to an undivided interest in
land was awarded to the common-law wife of the purchaser even though
the contract of purchase was entered into by the husband only, and the
husband had subsequently attempted to convey title to all the land. This
decision illustrates that a subsequent purchaser may be charged with no-
tice of his grantor's common law marriage and should make inquiries to
protect himself from the claims of common law spouses.
B. Easements and Other Rights
Easements and rights-of-way in Texas may be created by conveyance,
prescription, necessity, estoppel, or dedication to the public.' 20 As in past
113. Id. at 564.
114. Id. at 565.
115. 570 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. 1978).
116. Eiuitable adoption refers to a situation involving an oral contract to adopt a child.
In certain jurisdictions, a child has rights of inheritance from a person who has orally con-
tracted to adopt him but has not followed statutory procedure to do so. BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 482 (5th ed. 1979).
117. 570 S.W.2d at 887-88.
118. 574 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. 1978).
119. Legal title to the land was presumably held by the Veterans Land Board, the seller
under the contract with the husband, because there was no evidence that the Board had
executed and delivered a deed. Id. at 68 n.3.
120. See, e.g., Heath & Bentley (1978), supra note 2, at 34.
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years, 121 easements by prescription and by dedication to the public were
heavily litigated issues during the survey period.
1. Prescription and Dedication. To establish an easement by prescrip-
tion, the adverse user must establish that his or his predecessor's use of the
easement was open, hostile, adverse, uninterrupted, exclusive, and contin-
uous for the appropriate statutory time period.' 22 Contrary to the appar-
ent majority rule,' 23 the Texas courts require that the adverse user must
use the easement to the exclusion of the landowner. 124 Thus, in Love v.
Oguin,25 joint use of a roadway by the plaintiffs and the public in con-
junction with use by the owner of the burdened land was not sufficient to
establish a private or public prescriptive easement because such use was
permissive and, therefore, not adverse.126 Apparent or open use is another
necessary element in establishing an easement by prescription. 27 Thus,
City of Corpus Christi v. Krause 28 held that the city of Corpus Christi
failed to show an easement by prescription for operation of its pipeline
because the use of the pipeline was not sufficiently open to place the record
owners of the servient estate upon notice.' 29
In order to prove an easement by dedication of land to public use, the
claimant must be able to show that the landowner has by intentional, un-
equivocal acts or declarations, expressly or impliedly, dedicated the land
for use by the public, and the public has accepted such easement by its
use. 130 In Viscardi v. Pajestkal3' a declaration in a conveyance by a prior
landowner that it "has dedicated, and. . . does dedicate" 132 a certain por-
tion of its land for use as an alley was held sufficient to support the trial
court's finding that the landowner had dedicated the alley for use by the
general public. 133 The Texas Supreme Court noted that although the ex-
press language of the deed indicated that the landowner had attempted to
dedicate the usage of the alley to adjoining property owners and not to the
general public, that language was not controlling because the evidence
presented at trial showed that the city of Austin had made its trash collec-
tion for many years by use of the alley and that the general public had
from the time of such dedication also used the alley for egress and in-
gress. ' 34
121. See Heath & Bentley (1979), supra note 2, at 40-41; Heath & Bentley (1978), supra
note 2, at 34-35.
122. Hudson v. Gaines, 501 S.W.2d 734, 738 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, no
writ). See also Other v. Rosier, 148 Tex 485, 226 S.W.2d 622 (1950).
123. 3 R. POWELL, supra note 1, at 103.
124. O'Connor v. Gragg, 161 Tex. 273, 277, 339 S.W.2d 878, 881 (1960).
125. 572 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
126. Id. at 20-21.
127. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Whitehead, 27 Tex. 304, 309 (1863).
128. 584 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ).
129. Id. at 328-29.
130. O'Connor v. Gragg, 161 Tex. 273, 280, 339 S.W.2d 878, 881 (1960).
131. 576 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. 1978).
132. Id. at 18.
133. Id. at 18-19.
134. Id. at 19.
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In the absence of an express declaration, the landowner's intent to dedi-
cate the land for use by the general public must be evidenced by clear and
unequivocal actions. 35 McMullen v. King 136 points out that the usage of a
road by adjoining landowners and their respective licensees and invitees is
not sufficient to establish a public easement by implied dedication because
it does not establish acceptance by the public or intent to dedicate the road
for public use.137 The intent to dedicate may be presumed, however, if the
use is ancient in origin and no other evidence exists to show the intention
of the owner in allowing the use. 138 Thus, infrequent use by the public of
an isolated rural roadway for forty-five years and maintenance of the
roadway by the county was held sufficient in Love v. O/guin139 to prove
intention to dedicate. 140 Similarly, in King v. Walton 141 use by the general
public and maintenance of a road by the county from the 1940's to the
time of trial was held sufficient to support a finding that an easement was
created by implied dedication.142
2. Necessity and Estoppel. In Getz v. Boston Sea Party of Houston,
Inc. 143 the court stated that to establish an easement by necessity, the user
must prove unity of ownership, continuous and apparent use, and strict
necessity. 144 Appellee-lessee's claim of an easement by necessity of his
sewage line across the property of the appellant-owner lacked the essential
element of apparent use because the owner did not know of the existence
of the sewage line. 145 In Love v. 0/guin 14 6 the court held that to establish
an easement by necessity, the necessity not only must be of such a nature
that it is more than a mere convenience, but also must be in existence at
the time of severance of the dominant and servient estates. 147 In Plagge v.
Gambino148 the court decided that a conveyance of an interest in land by
means of a written lease for a term of years was a sufficient severance of
title to support the creation of an easement by implication, although the
lessee-claimant must still show strict necessity. 149
The doctrine of easement by estoppel is rarely used, but one case de-
cided within this survey period, Storms v. Tuck,' 50 involved the applica-
tion of this doctrine. In Storms the owners of the servient estate had
conveyed an easement for ingress and egress to their neighbors. The ease-
135. O'Connor v. Gragg, 161 Tex. 273, 280, 339 S.W.2d 878, 882 (1960).
136. 584 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
137. Id. at 709.
138. O'Connor v. Gragg, 161 Tex. 273, 279, 339 S.W.2d 878, 882 (1960).
139. 572 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
140. Id. at 22.
141. 576 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
142. Id. at 461.
143. 573 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ).
144. Id. at 838 (citing Mitchell v. Castellaw, 151 Tex. 56, 246 S.W.2d 163 (1952)).
145. Id.
146. 572 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
147. Id. at 21.
148. 570 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1978, no writ).
149. Id. at 109.
150. 579 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. 1979).
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ment covered a one and one-half mile long existing road that ran east-west
and a fifty-foot wide strip of land that joined the road and ran north-south.
The owner of the dominant estate sold her property and an undivided in-
terest in the easement to two separate grantees. Defendant, one of the
grantees, owned an additional 1,100-acre tract that adjoined the dominant
estates but did not adjoin the easement. Defendant paved a road across
the dominant estate to connect the easement to defendant's 1,100-acre
tract. Plaintiffs brought suit, seeking an injunction to prevent defendant
from using the easement for the benefit of his 1,100-acre tract. Although
the easement was not expressly appurtenant to the 1,100-acre tract, defend-
ant sought to establish that plaintiffs' action and conduct during the con-
struction of the road by defendant estopped plaintiffs from contending that
the easement could not benefit defendant's 1,100-acre tract. The court de-
cided that the facts presented were insufficient to create an easement by the
doctrine of estoppel in pais.' 5 1 Storms, unlike most cases in which the
doctrine of easement by estoppel has been applied, involved an express,
not a parol grant, and the central issue was accordingly the scope, not the
existence, of the easement. 152 In determining whether an easement by es-
toppel had been created, the court sought to determine whether the plain-
tiffs had communicated a misrepresentation as to the scope of the easement
to defendant, upon which defendant had relied. 153 The court held that
plaintiffs' observation of defendant's contruction of the road and plaintiffs'
failure to protest defendant's road-building during such contruction were
not sufficient to constitute a misrepresentation upon which an easement by
estoppel could be created, since plaintiffs had no duty to speak out and
protest defendant's construction of the road. 1
54
3. Express Easements. Many cases involving express easements concern
the scope of the easement's permissible use.'55 In Callejo v. City of Gar-
land 156 the use of the word "facilities" in a grant of an easement was held
to be unambiguous and to permit construction of electrical utility facilities
as well as construction and maintenance of an underground water pipe. 1
57
In City Public Service Board v. Karp158 the court held that a grant of an
easement for transformer purposes was sufficient to allow a change in the
nature of the transformer from an underground to a pad-mounted type.1
59
On the other hand, in Harris County Flood Control District. v. Shell Pipeline
Corp. 160 the court held that an easement for roadway purposes was not
sufficiently broad to cover reconstruction of a drainage ditch. Therefore,
151. Id. at 454.
152. Id. at 452.
153. Id. at 452-54.
154. Id. at 453.
155. See, e.g., Heath & Bentley (1978), supra note 2, at 37.
156. 583 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
157. Id. at 927-28.
158. 585 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ).
159. Id. at 842.
160. 578 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ granted).
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the defendant flood control district was held liable in damages sustained
by reason of the plaintiffs forced relocation of its pipeline to accommodate
the defendant's drainage ditch reconstruction. 16
The plaintiff river authority in Bradshaw v. Lower Colorado River Au-
thoril 162 sought to limit the defendants' use of an ingress and egress ease-
ment. In 1941 the river authority had conveyed to the defendants a 94.41-
acre tract of land that did not adjoin but was near the edge of a nearby
reservoir. In that conveyance the plaintiff granted an ingress and egress
easement to the defendants to permit them to reach the edge of the reser-
voir and to maintain a fence line for their cattle. The grant was made
subject to the plaintiffs right to use the servient estate for any purpose that
it might see fit. The court held that because the language of the grant was
of a general nature, it allowed the defendants reasonable access to the res-
ervoir for recreational purposes as well as for the grazing and watering of
their livestock, limited by the plaintiffs right to restrict or prohibit use of
the easement if the plaintiff should decide to use the servient estate in a
manner inconsistent with the access easement. 63
In Hale County v. Davis164 the court decided that the holder of a pre-
scriptive easement for roadway uses could not grant an easement to use an
irrigation pipeline to the fee owner's neighbor. 65 The court held that the
right to use the subsurface under the roadway easement remained in the
plaintiff, the fee owner, so long as that usage did not affect or impair the
use of the road.' 66 Thus, the holder of the roadway easement had no au-
thority to grant a pipeline easement burdening the plaintiffs fee simple. 1
67
In Preston Del Norte Villas Association v. Pepper Mill Apartments, Ltd 168
an express reservation of an ingress and egress easement across a condo-
minium development to undeveloped acreage retained by the grantor was
declared to be sufficiently broad to allow a successor-in-interest of the
grantor to use the easement in connection with the construction of an
apartment project. Defendants sought to establish that the grantor's sole
intent in reserving the easement was to benefit another condominium pro-
ject that the grantor planned to construct on the undeveloped acreage, and
that the easement was therefore ineffective to benefit an apartment project.
The court held that use of the phrase "regardless of whether such lands
[the undeveloped lands] or any part thereof, become a part of the Condo-
minium Project, . . . or some other condominium project," did not evi-
dence an intent to retain the access easement only if the undeveloped lands
were developed for condominiums and not apartments or other projects. 169
161. Id. at 498. After the survey period ended the supreme court affirmed the court of
civil appeals decision. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 58 (Nov. 7, 1979).
162. 573 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ).
163. Id. at 883.
164. 572 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
165. Id. at 64-65.
166. Id. at 66.
167. Id. at 65.
168. 579 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
169. Id. at 269.
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4. Enforcement. An issue sometimes presented in easement cases is
whether the party seeking to establish the existence or scope of the ease-
ment is entitled to enforce the right to use the easement.' 70 In Preston Del
Norte Villas Association v. Pepper Mill Apartments, Ltd 17' the court held
that lessees of an apartment owner who held an access easement could
acquire the right to use the easement under the terms of an apartment lease
and, as assignees, could enforce the terms of the easement. 72
A private landowner seeking to enforce a publicly dedicated easement
must establish that he has a property interest that will suffer if the pur-
ported easement is obstructed. 73 Two cases decided within the survey pe-
riod involve attempts of private landowners to bring themselves within this
rule. In Brooks v. Jones 74 the plaintiff sought to establish that he held a
prescriptive roadway easement adjoining his property in a north-south di-
rection and connecting to a purported public roadway easement running
east-west. The Texas Supreme Court held that plaintiff had failed to es-
tablish a prescriptive easement in the north-south road, and, therefore, be-
cause the east-west road did not adjoin his property, plaintiff lacked a
justiciable interest in the public status of this road. 175 In Love v. 0guin 176
the defendant similarly sought to establish that one of the plaintiffs lacked
a justiciable interest in a purported easement by implied public dedication
because the disputed roadway did not adjoin or cross the plaintiffs land.
The Texas Supreme Court held that the offered evidence reflecting that the
road actually crossed the plaintiffs land, coupled with the trial court's
finding that the roadway was public and provided access to plaintiffs land,
were sufficient to support a conclusion of law that plaintiff had a j usticiable
interest in the roadway.177
5. Relief When the owner of the servient estate interferes with the use
of an easement, the easement holder may seek equitable or legal relief or a
combination thereof. ' 78 Thus, in Gerstner v. Wilhelm, 179 the plaintiffs were
held entitled to actual and exemplary damages and injunctive relief be-
cause of the defendant's intentional and willful interference with the plain-
tiffs' use of an access easement across the defendant's land.' 80
170. See, e.g., Ladies' Benevolent Soc'y v. Magnolia Cemetery Co., 288 S.W. 812 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1926, judgmt adopted); MGJ Corp. v. City of Houston, 544 S.W.2d 171 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ refd n.r.e.); Cousins v. Sperry, 139 S.W.2d 665
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1940, no writ).
171. 579 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.). See text accompa-
nying notes 168-69 supra.
172. 579 S.W.2d at 271.
173. Fall v. Thompson, 126 Tex. 326, 87 S.W.2d 712 (1935).
174. 578 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. 1979).
175. Id. at 674.
176. 572 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Other aspects of
this case are discussed at text accompanying notes 139 & 146-47 supra.
177. 572 S.W.2d at 19.
178. See, e.g., Greer v. Robertson, 297 S.W.2d 279, 280-81 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1956, writ refd n.r.e.).
179. 584 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, writ dism'd).
180. Id. at 957.
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6. Loss of Easement. The dedication of a public easement may in some
instances be cancelled by the holder of the easement. 18' In City of Katy v.
Waterbury 82 plaintiff was allowed to introduce a 1912 commissioner's
court order, over the objections of defendant that the order was invalid, to
establish that a 1907 express dedication of a roadway easement across his
land had been cancelled. The court further upheld the jury's finding that
deed references by subsequent grantors to a plat showing the dedication
did not establish a rededication of the road. 183
C. Water Rights
One of the most significant real property cases in this year's survey pe-
riod is Friendswood Development Co. v. Smith-Southwest Industries, Inc. 184
In Friendswood an action was brought by certain landowners in the Clear
Lake area of Harris County against the defendant development company
and its parent, Exxon Corporation, for damages suffered on the subsidence
of the plaintiffs' land caused by the past and continued withdrawal of vast
quantities of percolating water from the defendants' wells. The plaintiffs'
petition in Friendswood alleged that the defendants, by common scheme,
had drilled numerous water wells and produced massive quantities of
water for sale to industrial users despite engineering reports showing the
resulting subsidence. The plaintiffs also pleaded that such withdrawal was
accomplished through the use of wells negligently spaced too close to-
gether with knowledge of the prospective subsidence and flooding of the
plaintiffs' lands. The actions of the defendants were alleged to be both
negligent and a continuing nuisance. The trial court entered summary
judgment for the defendants, following a long line of Texas cases estab-
lishing that in the absence of willful or malicious injury a landowner has
the absolute right to withdraw percolating water from his lands without
liability to adjacent property owners. 8 5 The court of civil appeals re-
versed and remanded, holding that plaintiffs' petition stated a cause of ac-
tion in both nuisance and negligence. 8 6 The Texas Supreme Court
reversed the court of civil appeals on the basis of stare decisis and affirmed
the trial court's judgment, but held that in future cases the law of negli-
gence, as well as that of intentional torts, will be applied to subsidence
resulting from withdrawal of underground waters.' 8 7
In the course of this important decision the supreme court had occasion
181. See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6705 (Vernon 1960), which grants a com-
missioner's court authority to discontinue a road.
182. 581 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
183. Id. at 760.
184. 576 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. 1978); see Heath & Bentley (1978), supra note 2, at 39-40, for a
discussion of the opinion of the court of appeals in Friendswood. See a/so 9 TEXAS TECH L.
REV. 392 (1978).
185. 576 S.W.2d at 22; Houston & T.C. Ry. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 81 S.W. 279 (1904)
(citing Texas Co. v. Burkett, 117 Tex. 16, 296 S.W. 273 (1927)).
186. 546 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977), rep'd, 576 S.W.2d 21
(Tex. 1978).
187. 576 S.W.2d at 30.
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to review the historical treatment of underground water rights by the
Texas courts. In 1904 the Texas Supreme Court expressly adopted the
English common law rule regarding underground water rights in the case
of Houston & Texas Central Railroad v. East.188 This rule is that a land-
owner obtains absolute ownership of the subsurface water he withdraws
and, absent willful or malicious injury, may continue to withdraw subsur-
face water without liability to adjacent landowners for lowering the water
table. I8 9 The East court rejected the American rule set forth in Basset v.
Salisbury Manufacturing Co., 190 which held that a landowner's right to
withdraw underground water is limited to the amount necessary for the
reasonable use of his land, and that the rights of adjoining landowners are
correlative. 191 The adoption of the English rule by the East court was sub-
sequently reaffirmed by the Texas Supreme Court in the 1955 decision of
City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton.192 The court in Friendswood
further pointed out that the Texas courts had relied upon the East case in
rejecting the correlative rights doctrine 193 in mineral cases and establishing
the rule of capture.194 Only after legislative action for the prevention of
waste did the Texas courts apply any semblance of the correlative rights
doctrine to mineral cases.' 95
Although no cases in Texas had ever applied the English rule of abso-
lute ownership in the subsidence context, 96 the Friendswood court found
that the Restatement of Torts197 makes a clear distinction between subsi-
dence caused by withdrawing minerals, for which an absolute liability ex-
isted, and subsidence caused by withdrawing subterranean water, for
which no liability existed.198 The court therefore determined that the Eng-
lish rule that a landowner may withdraw underground water without lia-
bility for lowering the water table under his neighbor's property was also
applicable when the withdrawal caused subsidence of his neighbor's
land. 199 The court in Friendswood found the doctrine of stare decisis to be
controlling in this case because parties to property and contractual transac-
tions should be entitled to rely upon the law as it existed at the time of the
transaction. 200
188. 98 Tex. 146, 81 S.W. 279 (1904); see 9 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 39 (1978).
189. See Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324, 152 E.R. 1223 (Ex. 1843) for the original
statement of the English rule.
190. 43 N.H. 569, 82 Am. Dec. 179 (1862).
191. Id. at 573-74, 82 Am. Dec. at 180-81.
192. 154 Tex. 289, 276 S.W.2d 798 (1955).
193. 576 S.W.2d at 24; see Storey v. Central Hide & Rendering Co., 148 Tex. 509, 226
S.W.2d 615 (1950).
194. 576 S.W.2d at 26. See generally Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture and Its Implica-
tions as Applied to Oil and Gas, 13 TEXAS L. REV. 391 (1935).
195. 576 S.W.2d at 26. In 1949, the legislature took similar action to prevent waste of
ground water. 1949 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 306, § 3c, at 559.
196. 576 S.W.2d at 27. Previous cases dealt with the lowering of the water table. Id.
197. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 818, 820 (1939) (current version at RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 818, 820 (1979)).
198. 576 S.W.2d at 27-28.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 30-3 1.
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The court did, however, enunciate a new doctrine to be applied to future
underground water rights cases. The court, relying on an expression of
legislative policy,201 stated that there was no longer any valid reason for a
special immunity to exist with respect to a landowner's liability for with-
drawing ground water.202 Therefore, the court adopted a hybrid version of
the correlative rights doctrine in order to protect the rights of landowners
against subsidence. The new rule is that liability for subsidence may be
imposed if a party whose land has subsided is able to prove that the de-
fendant's manner of withdrawing ground water is negligent, willfully
wasteful, or for the purpose of malicious injury, and such conduct is a
proximate cause of the subsidence of plaintiffs land. 20 3 The new rule was
limited by the court to the withdrawal of ground water from wells that are
either produced or drilled after the date of the opinion.2°4
In a vigorous dissent Justice Pope argued that neither the doctrine of
stare decisis nor the English rule of absolute ownership of ground water
was applicable in Friendswood. Justice Pope contended that the Friend-
swood case involved the right of the adjacent landowner to subjacent sup-
port.20 5 In Justice Pope's view the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action
because the right to lateral support is an absolute right in Texas and is not
subordinate to any right of the adjoining landowners, regardless of
whether such support was destroyed by excavation, ditching, flowing of
water, pumping of water, unnatural pressure or suction, or explosives.206
The Friendswood case leaves many unanswered questions. For example,
the court did not delineate what actions or conduct would constitute negli-
gent withdrawal of ground water. Other issues unanswered are the proper
treatment of the element of proximate cause in subsidence cases and the
type of relief and damages to which a plaintiff would be entitled if negli-
gent withdrawal were proven in a subsidence case.
D. Conveyances
Lone Star Industries, Inc. v. Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corp. 207 held
that when record title was held by partners in their individual names, a
deed of trust conveyance executed by each of the partners on behalf of the
partnership was effective to convey each partner's interest in the property,
in trust, to secure the described indebtedness to the plaintiff mortgagee. 208
Consequently, a subsequent judgment creditor holding an abstract ofjudg-
ment against an individual partner's interest in the property was
subordinate to the lien held by the plaintiff mortgagee, and the judgment
201. TEXAS WATER CODE ANN. § 52.021 (Vernon Supp. 1980) amended the previous
code by providing an additional purpose for the creation of water conservation districts: "to
control subsidence caused by withdrawal of water" from underground water reservoirs.
202. 576 S.W.2d at 30.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 31 (Pope, J., dissenting).
206. Id.
207. 586 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
208. Id. at 193.
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creditor's interest in the property was extinguished by foreclosure. 20 9
Freeman v. Southland Paper Mills, Inc. 210 involved the construction of a
deed containing a limitation clause providing that the conveyance to the
plaintiff was expressly made subject to any leases or instruments previ-
ously executed by plaintiffs predecessors-in-title. The defendants con-
tended that this clause required the plaintiff to prove that the lands sued
for had not been previously conveyed in order to maintain a trespass to try
title action. The court held that the plaintiff need not show that the undi-
vided mineral interest conveyed to it by the deed was not previously con-
veyed in order to maintain the action because the "subject to" clause
merely limited plaintiff's warranty of title.2'
In Randal v. Rutherford 212 the court held that parol evidence was admis-
sible to resolve an apparent ambiguity in a deed that described the mineral
interest conveyed as "a one-two-hundred-fortieth (1/240) interest . . . be-
ing all of the land . . . that the grantor . . . received from his deceased
parents," 213 when the interest so received was actually a one-twenty-fourth
(1/24) mineral interest. 214
The most interesting case involving the construction of conveyances
during the survey period is Terrell v. Graham. 215 Two brothers held cer-
tain land in Erath County as equal tenants in common. They simultane-
ously executed, delivered, and acknowledged separate general warranty
deeds purporting to convey to the other all of the disputed land, each deed
containing the following language: "This deed is written under Article
1996 [sic] R.C.S. of Texas, and shall take effect and become absolute on
my death. '216 One brother died in 1975, naming the appellee as sole devi-
see of his estate in his will. A year later the surviving brother, joined by his
wife, attempted to convey all of the land in fee simple to appellant. The
trial court held that no title passed under either of the simultaneously exe-
cuted deeds because the conveyances were testamentary in character and
were, therefore, ineffective attempts to devise real property.217 In the trial
court's view of the case, the appellee received an undivided one-half inter-
est in the land under the deceased brother's will and the remaining one-
half interest only was conveyed to appellant by the surviving brother. 2' 8
The court of civil appeals reversed and held that both the instruments were
effective deeds creating present estates in expectancy, 219 and the grantee
209. Id.
210. 573 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ).
211. Id. at 824.
212. 577 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ granted). This case has
been submitted to the supreme court. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 64 (Nov. 17, 1979).
213. 577 S.W.2d at 370.
214. Id. at 372.
215. 576 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1979).
216. Id. at 611. The parties apparently intended to refer to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 1296 (Vernon 1958), which provides for inheritance by deed or conveyance.
217. 576 S.W.2d at 611.
218. Id.
219. 569 S.W.2d 595, 597 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978), rev'd, 576 S.W.2d 610 (Tex.
1979). When a grantor conveys the title and interest specified in his deed, but full enjoyment
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under such a deed could devise his expectancy interest by will.220 There-
fore, appellant, as grantee of the living brother, held fee simple title to the
entire tract burdened by an estate in expectancy of appellee in an undi-
vided one-half interest, to take effect upon the death of the surviving
brother. 221 The Texas Supreme Court reversed, construing the convey-
ances in yet a third way.222 The supreme court held that the effect of the
conveyances under article 1296 was that each brother was left with a life
estate in an undivided one-half interest and a fee simple estate in expec-
tancy in the entire tract. 223 Upon the death of the first brother, the survi-
vor's estate in expectancy became vested and the deceased brother's estate
in expectancy ceased to exist. 224 Thus, the grantee of the surviving brother
took absolute fee simple title to all the land. 225
E. Avoidance of Conveyances
A party may attack the validity of an instrument of conveyance on sev-
eral grounds, including alteration, forgery, fraud, undue influence, lack of
capacity, and mistake. This year's survey period includes a number of
cases involving attempts to avoid instruments of conveyances.
In Berger v. Berger226 and Cozad v. Roman227 the primary issue was
whether the plaintiffs, in both cases children of the grantor, had an ade-
quate justiciable interest to seek cancellation of the conveyances involved.
The plaintiffs in Berger sought to prove that their father was incompetent
so that they might represent him in a suit to set aside his conveyance of
property to their brother. The trial court's determination that the plain-
tiffs' father was competent and did not require representation by a next
friend proved fatal to the plaintiffs' ability to bring the action. 228 The
court of civil appeals held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their
father's legal rights were involved, and, as long as he was competent and
alive, only he had standing to attack the conveyance.229 In Cozad a
daughter's attempt to cancel a contract of sale and deed executed by her
mother on the ground of undue influence by the grantee was unsuccessful
because she lacked standing. 230 The court found the plaintiffs claims that
(1) she might be appointed later as guardian of her mother in a pending
guardianship action, (2) she was a co-tenant of the land in question, and
(3) as a result of her kinship, she had certain moral obligations to protect
and possession do not occur until the death of the grantor, the interest conveyed is usually
referred to as an "estate in expectancy." 576 S.W.2d at 612.
220. 569 S.W.2d at 598.
221. Id.




226. 578 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).
227. 570 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).
228. 578 S.W.2d at 549.
229. Id.
230. 570 S.W.2d at 560.
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her mother's interests, were legally insufficient to establish plaintiffs stand-
ing. 23 ' The court left open the possibility, however, that plaintiff could
maintain an action by alleging, in an amended petition, her status as next
friend of her mother.232
If a party seeks to maintain an action to avoid an instrument of convey-
ance, a question arises as to where proper venue lies for the action under
article 1995.233 In DRG Financial Corp. v. Wade234 the plaintiff sought to
cancel certain conveyances on the ground of fraud, but the court of civil
appeals sustained the defendant's plea of privilege to be sued in the county
where the land at issue was located. The court noted that the action was
principally one to cancel certain deeds and, as an action involving title to
land, it must be brought, pursuant to article 1995, in the county where the
land is located. 235
National Bank of Commerce v. May236 involved the consequences of and
possible defenses to an action brought to cancel a deed because of altera-
tions made to it after its execution and delivery by the plaintiffs/grantors.
The plaintiffs established that their former friend, James M. Parks, and a
vice-president of the title insurer, Buck Farrish, altered the legal descrip-
tion from the partial conveyance intended by the plaintiffs of an undivided
26.75 percent interest, to one that purported to convey all of the plaintiffs'
interests in the disputed tract. After this alteration, Parks, through a whol-
ly owned company, mortgaged the property to the defendant bank, which
later foreclosed on the property. The bank received a title binder after
foreclosure from the defendant title company that had committed to insure
fee ownership to all of the disputed land in the defendant bank. The
plaintiffs sued Parks, Farrish, the bank, and the title company. Judgment
was entered in the trial court awarding the plaintiffs damages against
Parks and Farrish, quieting title to the 73.25 percent undivided interest not
intended to be conveyed by the plaintiffs in the plaintiffs against the de-
fendant bank, and awarding exemplary damages to the plaintiffs against
the defendant title company. 237 The court of civil appeals held that the
purported conveyance was void, not merely voidable, because the material
alteration occurred after the execution and delivery of the deed.238 Thus,
although the bank did receive valid title to the undivided 26.75 percent
interest intended to be conveyed, the court rejected the bank's contention
that, as a bona fide purchaser without notice of the alteration, it was enti-
231. Id. at 561.
232. Id. The court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's petition, holding
that the court erred in denying the plaintiff the opportunity to amend her petition in re-
sponse to the defendant's special exceptions. Id. at 562.
233. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(14) (Vernon 1958) provides that in a suit to
recover title to land, to remove encumbrances from land, or to quiet title to land, the suit
must be in the county where the land is situated.
234. 577 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
235. Id. at 352.
236. 583 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, no writ).
237. Id. at 687.
238. Id. at 689-90.
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tied to all of the property. 239
The bank in May raised two additional points, one predicated upon the
statute of limitations and the other based upon ratification. The court held
that the four-year statute of limitations, article 5529,240 was inapplicable
because the plaintiffs did not seek the equitable remedies of reformation or
cancellation but a declaration that the disputed deed was void.24' The is-
sue of ratification was more difficult to resolve. After learning that Parks
had altered the deed and subsequently encumbered all of the property, the
plaintiffs went to Parks and demanded a reconveyance of their 73.25 per-
cent undivided interest free of the bank's lien. A warranty deed was exe-
cuted that purportedly reconveyed this interest, but stated that the grantees
took the conveyance subject to, but without assuming, the debt and liens
described and secured by the bank's deed of trust. The bank contended
that the plaintiffs' acceptance of the property subject to the bank's lien was
an express acknowledgement of the validity of the defendants' purported
interests and title. In distinguishing the authority cited by the bank, the
court noted that acknowledgement of the validity of a prior lien upon tak-
ing a conveyance made subject thereto constitutes a ratification only when
made by purchasers, and that the plaintiffs were not purchasers. 242 The
bank also failed to establish the essential elements of ratification because it
did not prove that, at the time of the reconveyance, the plaintiffs took such
reconveyance with knowledge of all material facts. 243 The judgment for
exemplary damages against the defendant title company was reversed.244
The court held that, although exemplary damages may be awarded in an
action seeking equitable relief, exemplary damages were not recoverable in
this instance because no actual damages were assessed against the defend-
ant title company.245
Sawyer v. Pierce246 involved an action for rescission and cancellation of
a conveyance based upon material misrepresentation. In a sales brochure
and during negotiations, the defendants in Sawyer had knowingly and
falsely misrepresented to the plaintiffs the actual number of trailers that
could be placed upon the purchased property under certain county regula-
tions. Despite the general rule that everyone is presumed to know the law
and has no right to rely upon the representations of others concerning legal
matters, the court in Sawyer held that the defendants' superior knowledge
and intentional false representation prevented them from taking advantage
of the plaintiffs' ignorance of the county building regulations.247
Home v. Salado Creek Development Co. 248 treated the proper measure
239. Id.
240. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5529 (Vernon 1958).
241. 583 S.W.2d at 690.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 691-92.
245. Id. at 692.
246. 580 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
247. Id. at 125.
248. 576 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
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of damages to be applied in a case in which the plaintiffs were fraudulently
induced to subordinate a purchase money lien. The trial court ruled that
the plaintiffs were entitled to the amount of the purchase money note.249
The court of civil appeals reversed and held that the appropriate measure
of damages was the loss of the value of the lien caused by its reduction to a
secondary status, to be measured by the market value of the land in-
volved.250
In Wirtz v. Orr,25' a case involving damages for breach of contract and
fraud in an exchange of real estate, the court rejected the defendant's con-
tention that the closing statements prepared by the title company repre-
sented the true bargain of the parties. The court noted that the closing
statements were not so clear and unambiguous as to control provisions of
prior contracts of sale between the parties. 252
One method of attacking the validity of a conveyance is by alleging the
grantor's lack of competency. In Cottle v. Knapper25 3 it was held that the
plaintiffs testimony concerning an aged grantor's rapid weight loss, inabil-
ity to cook meals, and failure to understand the consequences of her ac-
tions was sufficient to support a finding that the grantor lacked mental
competency at the time of execution of a deed.254 Fortenberry v. Forten-
berry255 involved an overzealous attack by counsel for the plaintiffs who
sought to cancel a mineral deed and will because of the grantor's lack of
mental capacity. Statements of the plaintiffs' counsel implying that the
decedent's signature on such instruments was forged, in the absence of for-
mal pleadings on such point, and characterizing the defendants as "vul-
tures" waiting to "swoop down" upon their dying grandmother, and
requesting the jury to render a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs in order to
protect the jurors' grandparents, were considered inflammatory, prejudi-
cial, and grounds for a reversal. 256
In Castillo v. Euresf2 57 an attempt to show that a deed was in fact in-
tended to be a mortgage failed despite evidence presented by the plaintiff
tending to show that his parents had executed a note to the defendant's
predecessor-in-interest and had made monthly payments after the delivery
of the deed of their homestead. Because the title conveyed was only voida-
ble, the plaintiff was required to prove that the defendant took the prop-
erty with notice of the plaintiffs claim. 258
F. Title Insurance
1. Cases. Only two cases during this survey period involved title com-
249. Id. at 662.
250. Id.
251. 575 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ dism'd).
252. Id. at 70.
253. 571 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ).
254. Id. at 62.
255. 582 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
256. Id. at 190.
257. 579 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ).
258. Id. at 584-85.
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panies or insurance. In Tamburine v. Center Savings Association259 the
court held that the doctrine of principal and agent is not applicable to the
relationship between a title insurance company and the insured purchaser
because the company acts exclusively for itself when searching for infor-
mation upon which to base its decision to issue or deny an insurance pol-
icy.260 Accordingly, a title insurer's knowledge of plaintiffs equitable
claim cannot be imputed to its insured for the purpose of establishing ac-
tual or constructive notice. 26' In Lawyers Title Co. v. Arthur 262 a land-
owner had bonded against a lien and then obtained a release. Because the
title insurance company failed to record a release of lien, the court upheld
an order requiring the company to reimburse the property owner for pay-
ment of the bond premium for an additional year. 263
2. Legislation. Only two pieces of legislation were enacted during the
survey period directly affecting title insurance companies. Article 1.30 of
the Insurance Code 264 was amended by House Bill 1502265 to require title
insurance companies to notify the state insurance commissioner and de-
liver a copy of any order or judgment upon the following occurrences in
another state: (1) suspension or revocation of the right to transact busi-
ness; (2) receipt of an order to show cause why its license should not be
revoked or suspended; or (3) imposition of any penalty, forfeiture, or sanc-
tion for violation of the insurance laws of such other state. House Bill
1503266 amends four sections of article 9 of the Insurance Code,267 raising
fees for licenses from $2.00 to $25.00 and extending the period covered by
the license. The bill also requires that every title insurance company have
an annual audit at its expense. The original article had required only that
every title insurance agent should have an annual audit.
II. PURCHASES AND SALES OF REAL PROPERTY
A. Formation, Performance, and Interpretation of Contracts
The sale of a building or a parcel of land normally begins with a con-
tract between the buyer and the seller. In litigation arising out of the con-
tract, the initial questions are whether the agreement reached by the
parties is sufficiently definite to constitute a contract, and if so, whether
that agreement meets additional prerequisites to enforceability. Although
none of the cases within the survey period focused specifically on the issue
259. 583 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
260. Id. at 949.
261. Id. at 950.
262. 569 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
263. Id. at 580.
264. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1.30 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1979).
265. H.B. 1502, 66th Legis., Reg. Sess. (1979).
266. H.B. 1503, 66th Legis., Reg. Sess. (1979).
267. 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 765, at 1890 (Vernon) (amending TEX. INS. CODE
ANN. arts. 9.36, .39, .42-.43 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1979)).
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of the existence of a contract, 268 several 269 treated the issue of whether
agreements met the threshold standards for enforceability established by
the Statute of Frauds. 270 Of these, Krupicka v. White271 is the most nota-
ble. In Krupicka plaintiff had entered into an oral contract for the
purchase of land, entered into possession, and made improvements on the
property, after which the defendant repudiated the oral contract of sale
and refused to deliver a deed to the property.272 Plaintiff then brought suit
to recover the value of the improvements. Noting that it had found no
Texas cases directly on point, 273 the court adopted a rule prevalent in other
jurisdictions that "where a vendee under . . . an oral contract . . . makes
valuable improvements on the property and the vendor repudiates the con-
tract, the vendee may recover for such improvements to the extent they
enhance the value of the property. ' 274 The court recognized that its hold-
ing was not a genuine exception to the Statute of Frauds, since the relief
sought in Krupicka was not damages for breach of the contract or specific
enforcement, but rather recovery of the value of improvements by which
the defendant had been unjustly enriched. The holding thus extends a
familiar distinction between claims based on a contract and claims in
quantum meruit 275 to the context of real property purchases and sales.
Once the parties to a real estate sale have reached an enforceable agree-
268. But c Retama Manor Nursing Centers, Inc. v. Cole, 582 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ refd n.r.e.), dealing with an oral agreement to sign a writ-
ten construction contract that could not have been performed in one year. Relying on
"Moore" Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. 1972), the court held
that the doctrine of promissory estoppel eliminated the necessity for a writing in compliance
with the Statute of Frauds, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(6) (Vernon Supp.
1980), and then reached the question of whether the oral understanding was sufficiently
definite to constitute a contract between the parties. Retama Manor Nursing Centers, Inc. v.
Cole, 582 S.W.2d at 199-200.
269. E.g., Krupicka v. White, 584 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ);
Libby v. Noel, 581 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, no writ); Scott v. Bishop, 581
S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ refd n.r.e.). Libby dealt with whether a writ-
ing contained a sufficient legal description to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, 581 S.W.2d at
764, and typifies the diverse factual patterns found in the numerous cases dealing with that
question. See, e.g., Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. 1972); Kmiec v. Reagan, 556
S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1977); U.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. Dauley, 535 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. 1976). Scott
merely reiterates the rule of Hooks v. Bridgewater, Il1 Tex. 122, 126, 229 S.W. 1114, 1116
(1921), that an oral contract for sale of real estate is not required to comply with the Statute
of Frauds if the purchaser pays consideration, enters into possession, and makes valuable
permanent improvements. For a discussion of Krupicka, see text accompanying notes 271-
75 infra.
270. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon Supp. 1980). The statute requires
that a writing be signed by the person to be charged with a promise or agreement if, among
other things, the promise or agreement is "a contract for the sale of real estate," id.
§ 26.01(b)(4), or "a lease of real estate for a term longer then one year." Id. § 26.01(b)(5).
Other reasons for holding that a contract is unenforceable are illegality and contravention of
public policy. See generally 13 TEX. JUR. 2D Contracts §§ 167-265 (1960).
271. 584 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
272. Id. at 734-35.
273. Id. at 736. In previous cases involving oral contracts to convey land, the purchasers
had sought to recover on the contract, see e.g., Hooks v. Bridgewater, 11 I Tex. 122, 229 S.W.
1114 (1921), rather than in quantum meruit for the value of the improvements. See text
accompanying note 275 infra.
274. 584 S.W.2d at 736.
275. See Campbell v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 573 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. 1978);
Davidson v. Clearman, 391 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. 1965).
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ment, they may disagree as to the level of performance required by the
agreement. A variety of cases within the survey period dealt with this is-
sue, and with the closely related problem of interpreting the effect of con-
ditions precedent to the duty to perform. A common condition precedent,
particularly in residential transactions, is one excusing the buyer's obliga-
tion to close if suitable financing cannot be obtained. In two recent cases,
Renouf v. MartinP276 and Smith v. Nash,2 77 the seller, rather than the pur-
chaser, attempted to utilize a financing condition precedent to avoid a sale
after the purchaser, unsuccessful in his bid to obtain third party financing,
nevertheless tendered payment of the purchase price in cash. Both cases
held that a financing condition precedent is for the sole benefit of the
buyer and that a seller cannot take advantage of the condition to defeat the
sale if the purchaser waives it and elects to proceed with closing.278 These
cases strongly suggest that when conditions precedent are included in a
real estate contract, particularly conditions unrelated to financing, the
draftsman should clearly indicate for whose benefit the condition exists
and who has the right to waive satisfaction of the condition precedent.
The presence of express conditions precedent in a real property contract
also raises the related issue of whether any party is obligated to satisfy the
condition and, if so, how much time is allowed for satisfaction. In Carroll
v. Wied,279 the agreement at issue provided that the sale was contingent
upon purchasers' ability to secure a loan. After several delays in obtaining
financing, the seller repudiated the contract. The court considered the
question of how much time the buyer had to obtain financing before the
seller could consider the contract at an end. Under Texas law, time is of
the essence in an option contract, a contract under which one party can
unilaterally terminate the transaction or refuse to perform. The parties to
a contract of sale, however, may take a reasonable amount of time to per-
form.280 Since the parties in Carroll had not specified a time for satisfac-
tion of the condition, the court concluded that the contract was not an
option, and, therefore, the purchaser had a reasonable time in which to
perform.28' From this conclusion, the court derived an interesting corol-
lary. To avoid the doctrine that a contract unilaterally terminable by one
276. 577 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
277. 571 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ).
278. Renouf v. Martini, 577 S.W.2d 803, 804 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1979, no writ); Smith v. Nash, 571 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no
writ).
279. 572 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).
280. Eg., White v. Miller, 518 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ dism'd);
Copeland v. Bennett, 243 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1951, no writ). The absence
of a specified time does not render a contract of sale unenforceable; the law implies a reason-
able time for performance. See, e.g., Moore v. Dilworth, 142 Tex. 538, 179 S.W.2d 940
(1944).
281. Carroll v. Wied, 572 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).
The court in Carroll never discussed whether the contract at issue was specifically enforcea-
ble. Texas courts have consistently held that a contract under which the seller's sole remedy
is retention of an earnest money deposit is to be treated as an option contract. See, e.g.,
Paramount Fire Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 163 Tex. 250, 353 S.W.2d 841 (1962);
Texlouana Producing & Ref. Co. v. Wall, 257 S.W. 875 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924, judgmt
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party is an option,282 the court found an implied covenant that the pur-
chaser would diligently pursue the necessary steps to obtain a loan and
satisfy the financing contingency. 283 Thus, Carroll suggests a trend toward
a general rule recognizing an implied duty on the part of a party to attempt
to satisfy a condition precedent, the occurrence of which is principally
within his control, unless the contract is an option.284
B. Warranties and Fraudulent Practices
The most significant new development in the area of liability for war-
ranties and fraudulent practices in connection with real estate purchases
and sales was the enactment of amendments 285 to the Deceptive Trade
Practices---Consumer Protection Act (DTPA).286 The amendments, which
are only to be applied prospectively, 287 make numerous changes to the
DTPA, almost any of which could be significant under some circum-
stances. 288 The most generally significant change, however, was the addi-
adopted). The principle was reaffirmed in the recent case of Broady v. Mitchell, 572 S.W.2d
36, 40 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
282. See White v. Miller, 518 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ dism'd). See
generally 58 TEX. JUR. 2D Vendor and Purchaser § 58 (1964). The mere existence of a condi-
tion precedent does not render a contract illusory. E.g., Smith v. Nash, 571 S.W.2d 372, 375
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ); Nelson v. Jenkins, 214 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1948, writ refd).
283. Carroll v. Wied, 572 S.W.2d 93, 97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ)
(citing Nelson v. Jenkins, 214 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1948, writ refd); Wille-
ford v. Walker, 499 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, no writ)). Nelson,
however, stands only for the proposition that the existence of a condition precedent does not
make a contract illusory, since the only obligation implied by the court was one to apply
loan proceeds to the purchase price after the loan was obtained, not one to attempt to obtain
the loan. 214 S.W.2d at 144-45. The Willeford decision was based on Nelson without fur-
ther analysis of its holding that a buyer is under an implied duty to use reasonable efforts to
satisfy a financing condition. 499 S.W.2d at 192.
284. Cf. Willeford v. Walker, 499 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, no
writ), in which the contract provided for liquidated damages and would apparently have
been considered an "option" under the traditional rule in Texas. See note 281 supra.
285. S.B. 357, 66th Legis., Reg. Sess., 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 603, at 1327-33, amending
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.43, 45(a), .46, .50, .50A, .50B, .56, and .56A (Vernon
Supp. 1980).
286. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
287. S.B. 357, 66th Legis., Reg. Sess., 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 603, § 9, at 1332. Pro-
spective application can, of course, produce anomalous results. See Tate v. Wiggins, 583
S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ) (one plaintiff allowed to treble his dam-
ages, another not, because differing versions of the DTPA were applied).
288. The amendments make the following changes to the DTPA:
(i) section 17.43, the cumulative remedies section, is revised to preclude
double recoveries, S.B. 357, 66th Legis., Reg. Sess., 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch.
603, § 1, at 1327;
(ii) section 17.45(a), the definition of "knowingly," is revised to require
actual awareness of a breach of warranty, id. § 2, at 1327;
(iii) section 17.46, the list of per se violations, is expanded to include an
additional violation, see text accompanying note 289 infra; the violation under
§ 17.46(b)(22) for filing suit in a county other than the defendant's residence is
strengthened; and the authority of courts under § 17.46(c) to be guided by
similar decisions in foreign jurisdictions is expanded, id. § 3, at 1327-29;
(iv) section 17.50, authorizing a private cause of action is substantially
revised to clarify the scope of actual and punitive damages, and subsection
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tion of the following per se violation of the DTPA: "[Tjhe failure to
disclose information concerning goods or services which was known at the
time of the transaction if such failure to disclose such information was
intended to induce the consumer into a transaction into which the con-
sumer would not have entered had the information been disclosed. '28 9
Since real estate falls within the DTPA's definition of "goods," 290 and a
consumer transaction is defined to include a one-time sale between two
individuals, 29' the potential impact of the new subsection is enormous,
particularly for sellers of large commercial properties, who typically at-
tempt to avoid making any warranties or representations about their
properties.
Interestingly, the common law principle developed by the Texas
Supreme Court in Smith v. National Resort Communities, Inc. 292 parallels
the new section 17.46(b)(23) of the DTPA. In Smith a purchaser of a lake
front lot found that his lot lay within a Lower Colorado River Authority
easement permitting flooding of the entire lot. The promotional and other
materials the purchaser received did not, in the opinion of the Texas
Supreme Court, contain sufficient detail to put the purchaser on notice of
the fact that the lot was subject to intentional flooding.293 The court of
civil appeals had held that the seller's "duty was only to disclose facts
which would not be discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care and dili-
gence or which a reasonable investigation and inquiry would not un-
cover," 294 and had further concluded that the materials furnished to the
buyer should have put a prudent purchaser on notice that some lots lay
within the floodway easement and so led him to inquire further regarding
the exact situation of his lot.295 The Texas Supreme Court, while appar-
9(d) has been added, making the award of attorneys' fees to a prevailing con-
sumer mandatory, id. § 4, at 1329-30;
(v) section 17.50A, dealing with settlement offers, has been revised so
that a settlement offer found to be substantially the same as actual damages
will set an upper limit on the damage award. Additionally, the bona fide error
and no notice opportunity to cure defenses have been eliminated, id. § 5, at
1330-31;
(vi) section 17.50B has been added, creating several absolute defenses, id.
§ 6, at 1331-32;
(vii) section 17.56 dealing with venue, has been expanded to permit venue
in additional locations, id. § 7, at 1332; and
(viii) section 17.56A has been added, creating a two-year limitation pe-
riod, id. § 8, at 1332.
289. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(23) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
290. Section 17.45(1) defines "goods" as "tangible chattels or realproperty purchased or
leased for use. Id. (emphasis added).
291. Section 17.45(4) defines "consumer" as "an individual, partnership, corporation, or
governmental entity who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services." See
Singleton v. Pennington, 568 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ) (DTPA
applies to individual's sale of a used boat).
292. 585 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. 1979).
293. Id. at 657.
294. Smith v. NRC, Inc., 574 S.W.2d 639, 642-43 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978), rev'd
sub nom. Smith v. National Resort Communities, Inc., 585 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. 1979).
295. Id. at 643.
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ently accepting the rule of law applied below, 296 took a different view of
the facts. The supreme court found that, to put a prudent purchaser on
notice, the materials furnished had to disclose or give notice that the spe-
cific lot, not just some lots, were situated within the floodway easement. 297
While the reversal turned more on the facts than the law, it is significant
that both the appellate and supreme court opinions differed from the sug-
gestion of earlier scholarly commentary regarding standards of disclosure
in equitable suits for rescission.298 The rule applied in Smith, coupled
with the damage remedies available under the DTPA for failure to disclose
material facts,299 should combine to give buyers more effective devices for
protection against concealment, and to give sellers increased cause for cau-
tion in representing their properties. 3°°
C. Real Estate Brokers
Real estate brokers and salesmen, significant third parties to purchases
and sales of real estate, are closely regulated by the Real Estate License
Act.301 During the survey period, the Act was amended in several ways,302
including changes in the residency and educational requirements for licen-
sees, in the composition of the Texas Real Estate Commission, and in the
treble damages provision, which is now apparently available only in the
event of a criminal violation of the Act. 303
Judicial decisions during the survey period reflect a willingness among
the courts to interpret the Real Estate License Act strictly. In Coastal
296. Smith v. National Resort Communities, Inc., 585 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex. 1979).
297. "[A] careful reading... of the entire Declaration . . . would yet not have reason-
ably alerted them to the possibility that the mentioned easement encumbered the lot they
were purchasing." Id. at 659.
298. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 110, at 731-36 (4th ed.
1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551, comment (b) (1977); Keeton, Rights ofDis-
appointed Purchasers, 32 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1953).
299. See notes 289-91 supra and accompanying text.
300. While an exhaustive analysis of the Smith decision lies beyond the scope of this
Article, the advisability of creating judicial and statutory rules that place sweeping burdens
of disclosure on a seller in a commercial transaction between parties of relatively equal
sophistication is questionable. In the commercial setting the seller's liability for defects not
discovered by the buyer is often a carefully negotiated price term. These rules would be
especially inadvisable if the rule that a seller may become liable for actionable fraud based
on an affirmative untrue statement, even without actual knowledge of its falsity, were ex-
tended to apply to misrepresentation by omission. See Wright v. Carpenter, 579 S.W.2d 575
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ refd n.r.e.). In this situation, the seller's position
would be further worsened by the fact the buyer may generally choose between statutory
and common law remedies, id. at 578, at least if he can make his claim fit the statutory
requirements. Person v. Latham, 582 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). When parties deal unequally, as in Smith, or without consideration of warranty
liabilities, as in the typical "pre-owned" residential sale, however, it is appropriate that the
burden of disclosure and discovery should fall on the seller.
301. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a (Vernon Supp. 1980).
302. S.B. 171, 66th Legis., Reg. Sess., 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 585, at 1203-13.
303. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 19(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980). Treble dam-
ages, previously available to any aggrieved person for any violation of the Real Estate Li-
cense Act, are now available only in the event of a violation of § 19(a), which provides a
criminal penalty for acting as a broker or salesman without a license. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 6573a, § 19(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
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Plains Development Corp. v. Micrea, Inc. ,4 for example, the president of
the plaintiff corporation was duly licensed under the Act, but the corpora-
tion itself was not licensed. Since the commission sought was payable to
the corporation, the court held that the corporation must itself be licensed
in order to recover a commission, and that substantial compliance with the
Act would not suffice. 30 5 In Henry S Miller Co. v. Treo Enterprises,30 6 the
Texas Supreme Court again took a strict view of the license requirement as
a condition precedent to recovery of a commission, 30 7 holding that a bro-
ker could not avoid the licensing requirement merely by bringing suit on a
promissory note given in payment of a commission. 30 8
III. REAL ESTATE FINANCING
A. Mortgages
1. Lenders and the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection
Act. The application of the DTPA309 to real estate transactions was once
again the focus of court inquiry this survey period, 310 this time in the area
of consumer loans. The defendant in Hennigan v. Heights Savings Associa-
tion31" was a house purchaser who had assumed, with the written consent
of the lender, a preexisting first lien note, secured by a deed of trust, and
had subsequently defaulted. In a deficiency suit by the lender after fore-
closure, the defendant asserted that he was entitled to a set-off for alleged
violations of the DTPA. The defendant argued that because the lender's
failure to characterize insurance premiums that the deed of trust required
the borrower to pay as a finance charge was a violation of the Federal
Truth in Lending Act, 312 it necessarily constituted a "false, misleading, or
304. 572 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. 1978).
305. Id. at 298; accord, Henry S. Miller Co. v. Treo Enterprises, 573 S.W.2d 553 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978), af,'d, 585 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1979).
306. 585 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1979).
307. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 20(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
308. Henry S. Miller Co. v. Treo Enterprises, 585 S.W.2d 674, 676-77 (Tex. 1979). The
accuracy of the result depends on classification of the indebtedness as a commission. The
plaintiff argued before the supreme court that the promissory note represented partial
financing of the property's purchase price. The plaintiff, however, had characterized the
note in his pleadings as "representing the real estate commission due and owing from [de-
fendant]." Id. at 677.
309. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
310. For cases on this issue within the 1978 survey period see Heath & Bentley (1978),
supra note 2, at 57-58. See also Leikam & Corbin, Woods v. Littleton: Consumerism Comes
of Age, 18 S. TEX. L.J. 477 (1977); Comment, Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer
Protection Act." Application to Real Estate Sales, 19 S. TEX. L.J. 281 (1978); Note, Automatic
Treble Damages Under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, 29
BAYLOR L. REV. 595 (1977); Note, Treble Damages Under the Texas Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices-Consumer Protection Act, 15 Hous. L. REV. 212 (1977).
311. 576 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
312. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(c) (1976) ("charges or premiums for insurance, written in connec-
tion with any consumer credit transaction . . . shall be included in the finance charge un-
less" the creditor has made written disclosure that such insurance coverage is not a condition




deceptive practice" 3' 3 under the DPTA by virtue of the latter act's broad
reference 314 to the Federal Trade Commission Act. 315 The court dismissed
this contention by curtly observing that, since the loan had been consum-
mated prior to the effective date of the DPTA,316 failure to make any such
disclaimer could not give rise to a cause of action under Texas law. 317 The
court also found that the defendant had not introduced sufficient evidence
to support a cause of action under the Federal Truth in Lending Act. 318
In Thompson v. First Austin Co.3 19 the Fort Worth court of civil appeals
focused on a borrower's status as a consumer under the DTPA,320 rather
than the deceptiveness of the lender's act. In that case the plaintiff, a resi-
dential borrower, charged that the lender's foreclosure on the real estate
security was an unfair trade practice because of the lender's representation
in an earlier letter that it would not foreclose if the borrower met certain
conditions. The borrower sought to establish consumer status under the
DTPA by his alleged purchase of services at the time of the loan.32' He
itemized these services as "[r]eceipt of credit for loan payments, applica-
tion of proceeds of condemnation, payment of taxes and insurance through
[the lender], an extension of time for payment of debt. . . and application
of payment and posting of notices in case of foreclosure of deed of trust
lien."' 322 The court summarily rejected the borrower's contention that he
had "purchased services-a note and deed of trust. ' 323 The court found
instead that he had purchased the use of money with the note and deed of
trust. Since the borrower had purchased only the right to use the loan
proceeds, the court reasoned that he had no right to insist upon the op-
tional extension of payment time that had been included in that instru-
ment primarily for the benefit of the lender. The court reiterated the
general rule that, having advanced no additional consideration to the
lender, the borrower could not assert his right to such an extension. Con-
cluding that no services were purchased in the transaction of which the
borrower was complaining, the court found that he was not a consumer
within the definition of the DTPA and affirmed the take nothing summary
313. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a) (Vernon Supp: 1980).
314. Id. § 17.46(c)(1).
315. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976).
316. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.63 (Vernon Supp. 1980) (DTPA effective
May 21, 1973).
317. Even had the court accepted the plaintiffs bootstrapping of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act into the DTPA, its applicability would be limited solely to consumer transac-
tions, as the act explicitly exempts "credit transactions . . . [for] business or commercial
purposes." 15 U.S.C. § 1653 (1976).
318. 576 S.W.2d at 130.
319. 572 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
320. The cause of action provided in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon
Supp. 1980) is specifically made available to a "consumer."
321. "Consumer" is defined in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon Supp.
1980) as "an individual, partnership, corporation, or governmental entity who seeks or ac-
quires by purchase or lease, any goods or services."
322. 572 S.W.2d at 81.
323. Id.
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judgment against him. 324 The significance of this decision lies less in the
court's ultimate conclusion than in its observation that the borrower had
"purchased" the use of money. Presumably, the court would find that the
use of money itself is a "service" if that contention were before it.
In Riverside National Bank v. Lewis, 325 to be reviewed by the Texas
Supreme Court, the Houston (1st District) court of civil appeals found that
a borrower seeking to refinance an auto loan was a consumer within the
provisions of the DTPA. The court cited the dictionary definition of serv-
ices, quoted by the supreme court in an earlier decision not involving the
DTPA, 326 and cited with approval in the more recent decision of Woods v.
Littleton.327 From these authorities, the court concluded that "by seeking
to obtain the extension of credit from a bank, [the borrower] was seeking
to purchase services," 328 and, consequently, qualified as a consumer within
the purview of the DTPA. The lender's denial of credit, which the jury
had concluded was fraudulent, thus entitled the borrower to statutory rem-
edies. 329
A cogent argument can be made that the loan of current funds or the
extension of credit is indeed a service. 330 Whether the DTPA should apply
to such transactions is, however, another question. Various facets of lend-
ing practice are already highly regulated by state law. 331 The Federal
Truth in Lending Act 332 provides for "meaningful disclosure of credit
terms" 333 to individuals for nonbusiness or noncommercial purposes, 334
and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 335 prohibits discrimination against
potential borrowers on the basis of various personal criteria. Although
these federal statutes already regulate potentially deceptive lender activi-
ties in certain contexts, the availability of the broader reaching remedies 336
324. Id. at 82.
325. 572 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, writ granted).
326. "[A]ction or use that furthers some order of purpose: conduct or performance that
assists or benefits someone or something; deeds useful or instrumental toward some object."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2075 (1961), quotedin Van Zandt v.
Fort Worth Press, 359 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1962).
327. 554 S.W.2d 662, 667 (Tex. 1977). The Woods court's reliance on Van Zandt was
tenuous at best, as the Van Zandt court was attempting to classify services as personal or
otherwise in relation to the then current article 2226, authorizing recovery of attorney fees
by persons with a valid claim for personal services. If the excerpt of Van Zandt's dictionary
definition was not entirely appropriate in Woods, its third-handed borrowing in Riverside
was even less so.
328. 572 S.W.2d at 561.
329. The borrower was entitled to treble the amount of the actual damages, based on the
loss of a portion of his initial security deposit and injury to his credit rating, plus attorney's
fees, but not additional punitive damages. Id. at 561-62.
330. Arguably, the extension of credit is no different than a lease of present dollars in
return for rental payments (the debt service) and eventual reversion of the leased estate (the
principal balance).
331. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-3.01 to -6A.14 (Vernon 1971 & Pam.
Supp. 1971-1979).
332. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-91 (1976).
333. Id. § 1601.
334. Id. §§ 1602(h), 1603.
335. Id. § 1691.
336. The treble damages penalty provision is now triggered only by a knowing decep-
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of the DTPA to business as well as individual borrowers could encourage
an even more thorough policing of lenders' activities. The expense of such
regulation would, most likely, be passed on to the very borrower it seeks to
protect. The Texas Supreme Court's disposition of Riverside will be ea-
gerly awaited by lenders and borrowers alike.
2. Notice of Default and Foreclosure. This survey period also encom-
passed the usual volume of challenges to foreclosure. Zeller v. University
Savings Association337 dealt with the issue of adequate notice. In that case
the plaintiff mortgagor applied for a temporary injunction to halt foreclo-
sure proceedings under a second lien deed of trust on the ground that the
trustee conducting the sale had failed to comply with the statutory twenty-
one day notice requirement.338 The mortgagor then withdrew his motion
and entered an agreement in open court providing that if the mortgagee
purchased at the sale, it would reconvey the property to the mortgagor
subject to its superior purchase money lien, which had not been forclosed
upon. At the sale, however, an unrelated third party purchased the prop-
erty. In response to the mortgagor's subsequent suit to set aside the sale,
the court held that by allowing the sale to proceed and obtaining the right
to repurchase from the mortgagee, the mortgagor had waived his right to
complain of the defects in notice and posting. 339 The court further ob-
served that the mortgagee was not obligated to bid on the property by its
stipulation in open court, and that by agreeing to the stipulation the mort-
gagor had assumed the risk that the mortgagee would not be the high bid-
der.340 The court found no evidence to support the mortgagor's charge of
collusion between the mortgagee and the ultimate high bidder, observing
that, as "[e]ncouraging bidding at such a sale would not be illegal or im-
proper," a mere telephone inquiry as to the amount owed could not consti-
tute collusive or conspiratorial action.34 1
In Bering v. Republic Bank342 the Corpus Christi court of appeals reaf-
firmed the general rule that inadequacy of consideration, without further
evidence of an irregularity that may have caused or contributed to the in-
adequacy, does not constitute grounds for setting aside a trustee's sale.343
In that case the mortgagor alleged that the trustee's refusal to comply with
his request to delay the sale until 3:00 p.m. constituted such an additional
irregularity. The trustee had complied with the statutory requirement that
tion, somewhat alleviating the heretofore onerous penalty on the DTPA offender. TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(i) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
337. 580 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
338. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3810 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
339. 580 S.W.2d at 661.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. 581 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.).
343. See, e.g., American Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Musick, 531 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. 1975); Ro-
land v. Equitable Trust Co., 584 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ);
Prudential Corp. v. Bazaman, 512 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1974, no
writ); Smith v. Olney Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 415 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1967, no writ).
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notice of the date and time of sale be posted and had conducted the sale
within the posted hours of 10:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m.344 The court con-
cluded that the trustee's refusal to delay the sale was not an irregularity,
given the logistical improbability that the requisite funds could have been
transported to the location of the sale before the 4:00 p.m. deadline, even if
the mortgagor had been able to obtain them. The court did not consider
the mortgagor's tender of the debt plus interest and attorney's fees on filing
of his suit to be significant, 345 distinguishing a nonjudicial foreclosure
from an execution sale, 346 in which mere inadequacy of consideration may
constitute equitable justification for setting aside the sale upon the judg-
ment debtor's prompt offer to return the purchaser's investment and reim-
burse all costs.
The question of the requirements of a foreclosure under a deed of trust
was a moderately litgated issue this survey period. In Williams v. Hender-
son 347 the buyer had executed a promissory note secured by a vendor's
lien purportedly reserved in a warranty deed and by a deed of trust. After
the buyer's default, the trustee conducted a foreclosure sale at which the
property was resold to the original seller. The seller then instituted pro-
ceedings to recover a deficiency based on the alleged outstanding balance
of the note adjusted by an unitemized amount for expenses of sale and
depreciation. In affirming the lower court's take nothing judgment, the
Houston (lst District) court of civil appeals observed that the secured note
holder who resorts to his security, rather than seeking a personal judgment
against the maker, must demonstrate that the foreclosure was made pursu-
ant to a valid sale and that the maker has been credited with the sale pro-
ceeds and any other legitimate amounts before suing for any deficiency. 348
The court found the evidence insufficient to establish that the required no-
tice of delinquency and acceleration had been given and that the buyer
had received a deed to his property. 349 Unless the buyer had received a
deed, he had no interest to transfer to the trustee under the deed of trust.350
Not only was the sale dubiously documented, but neither the maker nor
the holder was certain of the amount owing on the note at the time of the
sale. The court held that the procedural rule that the execution of a note
not properly denied is prima facie evidence of the amount due351 applies
344. TEX. REV, CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3810 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
345. See also Sparkman v. McWhirter, 263 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1953,
writ refd) (tender after sale not grounds for avoidance). But ef. Hiller v. Prosper Tex., Inc.,
437 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1969, no writ) (tender after sale pre-
cludes mortgagee from exercising option to accelerate); Lewis v. Investor's Sav. Ass'n, 411
S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1967, no writ) (rejected tender prior to sale can be
grounds for temporary injunction of the sale).
346. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 621-56 for rules governing the conduct of an execution sale.
347. 580 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).
348. Id. at 39.
349. Id. at 40.
350. Id. Although the deed of trust had been executed and was introduced into evi-
dence, it enabled the trustee to convey no greater title in the event of sale than had been
conveyed to the maker by the initial deed, which was not introduced into evidence.
351. TEX. R. Civ. P. 95.
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only to an uncontested note regular on its face and was clearly inappropri-
ate to the case at hand because payment had been affirmatively alleged. In
light of the irregularity of the transaction, the trustee's inability to account
for the amount due, the amount paid at the sale, or the sum of expenses
and depreciation, the court declined to award the note holder any further
amount as a deficiency.
Wood v. Henry S Miller Co. 352 and Smart v. Tower Land & Investment
Co. 353 also involved suits by mortgagees who had repurchased the mort-
gaged property at foreclosure sales. In those cases the mortgagees sought
indemnification for delinquent ad valorem taxes paid after foreclosure.
The mortgagees argued that deed of trust provisions permitting any ex-
penses incurred and paid by the mortgagee in Smart and any delinquent
taxes paid by the mortgagee in Wood to be added to the secured debt,
entitled them to personal judgments for the amounts paid. In both cases,
the Texas Supreme Court disallowed the mortgagees' recovery, observing
that the provisions in the deeds of trust did not create an additional obliga-
tion to reimburse taxes paid by the mortgagees (whether before or after
foreclosure) independent of the mortgage debt, but rather added such
amounts to the mortgage debt. The court also dismissed the mortgagees'
arguments of equitable subrogation for payment of the mortgagor's debts
because the payments benefited not the dispossessed mortgagors but the
mortgagees who thereby protected their ownership interests from foreclo-
sure by the taxing authorities. 354
The burden of proof to support a temporary injunction of a trustee's sale
was at issue in In re Marriage of Rutherford.35 -5 The plaintiff in Rutherford
succeeded in securing a temporary injunction to preserve the status quo by
alleging both probable injury arising from loss of rental revenue and prob-
able success on the merits based on the current holder's wrongful refusal of
tender in light of his knowledge of the prior holder's waiver of timely pay-
ment. This decision reaffirms the observation of an earlier Survey author
that "it is fairly easy to stall a foreclosure sale."'356
3. Wrongful Foreclosure. In Tower Contracting Co. v. Central States,
Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund35 7 the plaintiff mortgagor un-
successfully attempted to recover damages for alleged wrongful foreclo-
sure and tortious interference with negotiations to avoid the foreclosure.
352. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 246 (Mar. 12, 1980), a "g 584 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1979).
353. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 241 (Mar. 12, 1980), rev'g 582 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1979).
354. Because a mortgagee who purchases property with taxes outstanding is considered
to have adjusted his bid to reflect such additional liability, the equities of the situation did
not warrant full subrogation of the mortgagee to the rights of the taxing authorities to a
personal judgment for such taxes. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 244.
355. 573 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also Deer
Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Adair, 574 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ),
for an earlier case dealing with this issue.
356. Wallenstein, Properly, Annual Surpey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 29, 46 (1975).
357. 581 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Based on untrue assertions in its sworn petition, the plaintiff had obtained
on June 2 a temporary restraining order on the trustee's sale posted for
June 3. Several days prior to a scheduled hearing on the plaintiffs appli-
cation for a temporary injunction, the trustee posted notice for a sale on
July 1. The defendant mortgagee then intervened and agreed to withdraw
its action for wrongful issuance of the restraining order in return for the
plaintiffs abandonment of their action for a temporary injunction. The
parties agreed that if a new agreement was not reached before July 1, the
trustee would be free to foreclose without the plaintiffs further interfer-
ence. The trustee proceeded to sale on July 1, in accordance with its sec-
ond posted notice. The plaintiff sued for damages in the amount by which
the fair market value of the property exceeded the purchase price at sale,
arguing that the second notice was void because it was posted in violation
of the restraining order, and that the existence of the restraining order
chilled bidding activity. The irony of the plaintiffs argument was not lost
on the court. The court observed that even if the agreement among the
parties had not constituted a waiver by the plaintiff of any right to contest
the validity of the sale on the ground of improper posting, the plaintiff
should have made its objections clear before the sale took place.358 Fur-
thermore, absent a demonstration of its good faith in obtaining the tempo-
rary restraining order, the plaintiff should not be permitted to use its own
wrong to create a cause of action in its favor by complaining of chilled
bidding as a result of that order.359 The court further observed that the
plaintiff's failure to present a certificate at the application for the re-
straining order indicating that it had notified or attempted to notify the
defendant's counsel violated a local procedural rule designed to eliminate
precisely the type of problem that prompted the present litigation. 360
The related issue of slander of title was discussed in American National
Bank & Trust Co. v. First Wisconsin Mortgage Trust.361 In that case the
plaintiff had purchased and leased back certain land, exclusive of the
apartment complex located thereon. On completion of the transaction, the
plaintiff promptly filed the deed and memorandum of lease. Subse-
quently, the lessee limited partnership's sole corporate general partner exe-
cuted a deed of trust purporting to encumber both the improvements and
the land to secure a note to the defendant. Prompted by the limited part-
nership's flight to the bankruptcy court, the plaintiff terminated the lease
and took over supervision of the project. The plaintiff then sought a pur-
chaser for its interest, offering the defendant a right of first refusal. After
the plaintiff had located a purchaser, the defendant refused to match the
purchaser's offer, instituted foreclosure proceedings, and filed its deed of
trust of record. Plaintiff sued to remove this cloud on its title, alleging
slander of title. The court recited the five elements of such an action: (1)
the utterance or publication of (2) false and (3) malicious words that (4)
358. Id. at 727.
359. Id. at 727-28.
360. Id. at 728.
361. 577 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ ref d nr.e.).
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result in special damages to a (5) party possessing an estate or interest in
the disparaged property.362 The falsity of defendant's claim to a valid lien
was apparent from the public record, which clearly disclosed that the lim-
ited partnership as lessee could not assign its lease without the consent of
the lessor. The defendant's malice was also apparent from its refusal to
release, and knowing foreclosure of, its invalid claim. The court of appeals
approved the lower court's award of exemplary and actual damages for the
defendant's refusal to release the lien in the amount of the difference be-
tween the purchase price originally agreed to by the purchaser and the
actual purchase price.363 The court denied actual damages based on fore-
closure, however, on the ground that they were not separately supportable,
and observed that attorney's fees are not recoverable in a slander of title
action.364 Plaintiff asserted alternatively that attorney's fees should be re-
coverable as an expense incurred in court to remove the cloud on its title,
but the court pointed out that even if the plaintiff were entitled to recover
such amounts, it had failed to support its claim by segregating its ex-
penses.365 Finally, the court rejected defendant's argument that the lease
transaction had in reality been a mortgage. 366
4. Legislation. Of passing interest to the real estate financing area are
recent legislative enactments allowing new sources, or broadening existing
sources, of financing, primarily for residential and farming purposes. The
Texas Housing Finance Corporations Act,3 6 7 signed on June 14, 1979, en-
ables local governing bodies to create public nonprofit corporations 368 for
financing the cost of residential ownership to low and moderate income
persons. Once constituted, such a finance corporation may make or
purchase mortgages on one to four family residential units, lend money to
lending institutions, on condition that the net proceeds of such loans be
employed in making home mortgages, and issue bonds bearing a maxi-
362. Id. at 316.
363. Id. at 317-19.
364. Id. at 319-20. The court cited Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Howth, 133 S.W.2d 253
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1939), rev'd on other grounds, 138 Tex. 357, 159 S.W.2d 483
(1942), for this proposition, and refused to accept the more lenient attitude toward recovery
of damages in a slander of title action expressed in Walker v. Ruggles, 540 S.W.2d 420, 474
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ).
365. 577 S.W.2d at 320.
366. Id. See also Transamerican Leasing Co. v. Three Bears, Inc., 586 S.W.2d 472 (Tex.
1979) (plaintiff failed to establish that putative leases were lease-purchase agreements);
Southwest Park Outpatient Surgery Ltd. v. Chandler Leasing Div., 572 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1978, no writ) (court refused to find equipment lease with nomi-
nal purchase option on expiration in reality a usurious loan). See generally Egan, Sale-
Leaseback: Protecting the Institutional Investor Against New Risks, 6 REAL EST. L.J. 199
(1978); Furner, Tax Aspects of Sale Leasebacks, 32 ALA. LAW. 202 (1974); Marcus, Real
Estate Purchase-Leasebacks as Secured Loans, 2 REAL EST. L.J. 664 (1974); Comment, Real
Estate Sale-Leaseback Agreements Under Texas Usury Law. Circumvention or Sale?, 7 ST.
MARY'S L.J 821 (1976).
367. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 12691-7 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
368. If, on application by three or more of its residents, the local government concludes
that formation of such a corporation would be "wise, expedient, necessary, or advisable," it
may approve the proposed articles of incorporation. Id. art. 12691-7, § 4.
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mum ten percent interest rate to defray the development costs of any resi-
dential development. The potential economic impact of the Texas
Housing Finance Corporation Act could be significantly reduced, how-
ever, if the current congressional scrutiny 369 of such tax-free municipal
bonds results in the withdrawal of exemption from federal taxation of such
bonds.
The Family Farm and Ranch Security Program 370 was authorized by
electoral approval of S.J.R. 13, 37 1 amending section 50c of article III of the
Texas Constitution. This program, to be supported by the Farm and
Ranch Security Fund,372 provides for the guarantee by the commissioner
of agriculture that in the event of default on a family farm and ranch se-
curity loan 373 the state will pay ninety percent of the sum due under the
first lien to the lender.374 Applicants for such loans must meet certain eli-
gibility criteria, including a net worth not in excess of $100,000 and some
vocational training or experience in the type of activity to be enabled by
the loan.375 In the case of default, the agriculture commissioner will con-
duct a hearing as a contested case to establish that default has in fact oc-
curred. In that event, the lender must assign his security interest to the
state in exchange for payment of ninety percent of all sums payable.
376
The loans may not be assumed but must be fully retired on a sale of the
farm land, thereby promoting the legislative intent to assist the individual
qualified borrower and not subsequent buyers.3
77
Finally, S.B. 267378 will have an incidental impact in the real estate
financing area. That legislation amends the insurance code379 to allow do-
mestic life insurance companies to lend funds secured by first liens on real
property based on a greater percentage of the total value of the property
than was formerly allowed. 380
369. S. 1180, 16th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S6727 (daily ed. May 24, 1979); H.R.
3712, id. at H2534 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1979); H.R. 4125, id. at H3411 (daily ed. May 16,
1979); H.R. 4189, id. at H3600 (daily ed. May 22, 1979); H.R. 5741, id. at H9970 (daily ed.
Oct. 30, 1979).
370. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 55g (Vernon Supp. 1980).
371. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, Proposed Constitutional Amendment-Farm and Ranch
Real Estate-Guarantee of Loans, at 3219, amending TEX.- CONST. art. III, § 50c.
372. This program will be funded by the issuance and sale by the commissioner of agri-
culture of up to $10,000,000 in farm and ranch security bonds. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 55g, § 14 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
373. A qualifying loan must be used to purchase farm or ranch land to be used for agri-
cultural purposes and as a primary occupation. Id. § 6(5).
374. Id. § 2.
375. The applicant must also be a U.S. citizen who has resided in Texas for five years,
and must meet credit standards established by the commissioner. 'Id. § 6.
376. Id. § I I(b).
377. Id. § 10.
378. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 589, at 127.
379. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.39, part II (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1979).
380. The amendment permits loans up to 90% of the value of a one- to four-family resi-
dential dwelling; up to 95% of the value of a one- to four-family residential dwelling, pro-
vided the unpaid portion of the loan in excess of 80% is guaranteed or insured by a mortgage
insurance company qualified to do business in Texas; or up to 75% of the value if the loan is




1. Interest. Interest has been statutorily defined as the lawful compen-
sation for the "use or forebearance or detention of money."'381 The identi-
fication of particular charges arising in the context of a loan transaction as
interest has been the subject of extensive court interpretation.382 In
Stedman v. Georgetown Savings & Loan Association383 the Fort Worth
court of appeals reaffirmed that actual commitment fees, even though des-
ignated by the parties as interest, will not be treated as interest. 384 In that
case the borrower accepted the lender's loan commitment for $60,000 and
paid a ten percent per annum fee during the eight months prior to closing
the loan. The lender set aside and reserved on its books, but did not actu-
ally escrow, the loan amount as it had agreed in the commitment. In re-
sponse to the borrower's suit for usury, both the trial and appellate courts
concluded that the commitment and subsequent loan were two separate
transactions. 385 Payments prior to the execution of the note were not inter-
est but, rather, consideration for an option to secure the permanent financ-
ing on set terms. The parties' designation of this consideration as interest
was not controlling.386 Furthermore, the lender's failure to escrow the
amount was, in the court's opinion, immaterial, as the lender was never-
theless bound to lend the funds if and when the option was exercised. 387
2. Savings Clause. Common boiler plate language that often appears in
notes and deeds of trust in real estate related transactions is the "savings
clause." Such a clause generally provides that the parties do not contem-
plate payment of interest in excess of the maximum legal rate in connec-
tion with the transaction and that any excess will be applied to the
principal. 38 8 More specific provisions may refer to application of the ex-
Pam. Supp. 1963-1979). Formerly there was a flat limitation of two-thirds of the property
value. 1959 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 282, § I, at 626
381. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01(a) (Vernon 1971).
382. See cases discussed in St. Claire, The "Spreading of Interest" Under the Actuarial
Method, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 753, 755-57 (1979); Student Symposium-A Study of Texas
Usury Law (pt. 3), 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 825, 880 (1979); Note, Late Charges in Deeds of Trust
as Usury, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 174 (1978); Note, Loan Fees.: Additional Interest or 'Reason-
able Expenses"?, 13 Hous. L. REV. 773 (1976).
383. 575 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978), af'd, 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 98
(Dec. 15, 1979).
384. See Gonzales County Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Freeman, 534 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1976)
(bona fide commitment fee is not interest). See generally Student Symposium, supra note
382, at 892; see also Loomis v. Blacklands Prod. Credit Ass'n, 579 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1979, writ refd n.r.e.) (required purchase of stock of federally chartered pro-
duction credit association not a front-end charge).
385. The court noted that "the commitment could have been completed and terminated
without implementation of the loan." 575 S.W.2d at 416.
386. The label given by the parties was not controlling, as the money denominated as
interest had no principal on which to attach. Id See also Delta Enterprises v. Gage, 555
S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
387. 575 S.W.2d at 417.
388. See, e.g., State Bar of Texas, Deed of Trust Form, at 3 ("Nothing herein or in said
note contained shall ever entitle Beneficiary, upon the arising of any contingency whatso-
ever, to receive or collect interest in excess of the highest rate allowed by the laws of the
State of Texas on the principal indebtedness hereby secured or on any money obligation
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cess in the event of prepayment or acceleration, tracking the statutory
safety valve of section 1.07 of the article 5069.389 Prior to a recent supreme
court decision, the effect of such clauses on the legality of an alleged usuri-
ous instrument was uncertain. 390 The decision of the Texas Supreme
Court in Smart v. Tower Land & Investment Co. 3 9 1 suggests that the sav-
ings clause is central to a determination whether the presumption of legal-
ity accorded allegedly usurious contracts will be overcome. In that case
the defendant mortgagor defaulted on a purchase money note and the
mortgagee purchased at the trustee's sale. In defending the mortgagee's
suit to recover for taxes paid, the mortgagor asserted that the note was
usurious because, by its terms, it permitted the mortgagee to retain all in-
terest payments collected, including three years of prepaid interest, without
applying any of that amount to principal upon default and acceleration.
Confronted with the express provision that such prepaid interest would not
be refunded on acceleration, the court was unable to presume that the re-
tained interest would be credited to principal, a construction traditionally
favored by courts when faced with a possibly usurious contract. 392 "Hav-
ing affirmatively provided for the retention of unearned interest [the
payee] was obliged to make further provisions ensuring that the retention
of this interest would not result in a usurious contract." 393 Because neither
the note nor the deed of trust contained a savings clause, the presumption
of legality could not be maintained.
In Rickman v. Modern American Mortgage Corp. ,394 however, the Fifth
Circuit implied that a savings clause could aid the lender's position. In
that case the defaulting maker of an FHA insured note asserted the right to
the statutory usury penalty on grounds that various front end charges con-
stituted interest and resulted in an effective rate in excess of ten percent.
hereunder and in no event shall Grantors be obligated to pay interest thereon in excess of
such rate.").
389. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069, § 1.07 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1979).
390. See, e.g., Imperial Corp. of America v. Frenchman's Creek Corp., 453 F.2d 1338,
1344-45 (5th Cir. 1972). The sentiment of the Houston court of civil appeals that such
clauses should not enable the parties brashly to disclaim clearly documented usurious inten-
tions, is not without validity. See Ferguson v. Tanner Dev. Co., 541 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1976), rev'd, 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977). In a recent per curiam
opinion, the Texas Supreme Court observed that
[t]he subjective intent of the lender is irrelevant if, in fact, the lender has con-
tracted for, charged or received interest on a loan in excess of the maximum
permitted by law. To avoid the penalties imposed by article 5069-1.06, the
lender is required to plead, prove, and obtain a finding that his contract for,
charge or receipt of usury was a result of accidental and bona fide error.
Cochran v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 586 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. 1979), aft'g., 568 S.W.2d 672
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978). In that case the real estate lender, who had actually charged
interest in excess of 10%, failed to satisfy the burden of proof that the violation resulted from
accidental and bona fide error in order to escape the usury penalties of TEX. REV. CiV. STAT.
ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1979).
391. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 241 (Mar. 12, 1980), rev'g 582 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1979).
392. E.g., Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co., 120 Tex. 400, 30 S.W.2d 282 (1930),
on motion for rehearing, 39 S.W.2d 11, cert. denied, 284 U.S. 675 (1931).
393. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 246.
394. 583 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1978).
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After establishing that the lender had neither charged nor contracted for
usurious interest, the court briefly entertained the borrower's argument
that on foreclosure the lender had received payment of the stated princi-
pal, rather than the lesser amount that had actually been disbursed at the
time of the foreclosure, resulting in a return in excess of the statutory max-
imum. The stated principal was "received," argued the borrower, by
means of an FHA settlement that discharged the entire indebtedness. The
court observed that "[t]hough intriguing, the . . . argument must fail," if
not for intrinsic weakness, then because the effect of the savings clause
could be overlooked. 395 Clearly, the court was unwilling to construe a pa-
tently lawful contract as an illegal one, and the savings language further
established the lender's lawful intent.
Finally, in Spanish Village, Ltd v. American Mortgage Co. 396 the court
curtly disposed of the plaintiff note maker's contention that the note in-
volved was usurious by its terms and, therefore, the disclaimer of usurious
intent contained in the note was ineffective. The plaintiff argued that the
note, providing for interest for thirteen and one-half months and then
principal and interest payments over forty and one-sixth years, was divisi-
ble into two transactions, an interim loan covered by a building loan
agreement with the lender and a permanent loan covered by a commit-
ment contract between the lender and the Government National Mortgage
Association. The court disagreed, finding one forty-one and one-half year
loan, the interest on which, when spread over the entire term of the loan,
was not usurious. Turning to the plaintiffs savings clause contention, the
court cited Nevels v. Harris397 for the proposition that a savings clause
should, if at all possible, be construed to express the intention of the parties
to prevent the collection of usurious interest, though not to remove the
taint of a contract usurious on its face. 398
3. Corporate Subterfuge. Although the Texas Supreme Court has yet to
address the issue, the now common lender's requirement that the borrower
incorporate to allow the charging of higher interest rates was held to be
nonusurious in a number of appellate court decisions this survey period.399
395. Id. at 158.
396. 586 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
397. 129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W.2d 1046 (1937).
398. 568 S.W.2d at 201. In Kin-Ark Corp. v. Boyles, 593 F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1979), a
diversity case, the court acknowledged the existence of Texas cases giving effect to savings
clauses in notes. In that case, the challenged promissory note evidencing an indebtedness
not related to real estate provided for an interest rate payable quarterly at 1.25% above the
prime rate charged by a named bank. As the prime rate rose, the lender continued to collect
interest under this formula. The court concluded that the note, which did not contain a
savings clause, was not usurious on its face but did permit the lender to charge interest in
excess of the legal rate and, hence, was usurious. The fact that the lender actually charged a
usurious amount could not be dismissed as an accidental and bona fide error, so the lender
was not absolved of its liability for the statutory penalties.
399. See Prestonview Co. v. State Mut. Investors, 581 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Franklin Offices, Inc. v. Harding, 579 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1979, no writ); Dicker v. Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corp., 576 S.W.2d 672
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Peters v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp.,
1980]
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The courts have consistently found that so long as the corporation was
properly formed, the lender's requirement that the loan be made to a cor-
poration to enable a higher interest charge does not render the transaction
usurious.
Preston view Co. v. Slate Mutual Investors4°° added an interesting twist to
the conventional fact situation in which the disgruntled borrower cries
usury and attempts to throw off its corporate mantle. In Prestonview,
shortly after signing a note bearing interest in excess of ten percent, and
nearly a year before the closing of the permanent financing, the corporate
borrower transferred the property that was to serve as security for the in-
debtedness to the plaintiff, a partnership, without the lender's knowledge.
The plaintiff charged the lender with usury on the grounds that the lender
had constructive notice through the recording statutes that title to the se-
curity was in the partnership name and, consequently, knowledge that the
loan was made to the partnership. The court declined to accept the plain-
tiff's theory that the loan had been made to the partnership, referring to the
loan documents and other summary judgment evidence to establish that
the corporation was actually the borrower, and observing that the lender's
constructive notice of the partnership's record title to the security would be
insufficient to make the partnership the borrower. Furthermore, even if
the partnership had been the actual borrower, its deliberate concealment
of that fact in the underlying documentation not only negated the implica-
tion of the lender's usurious intent, but deprived the plaintiff of any right
to assert such a cause of action.40' The court also observed that, in any
event, constructive notice of a borrower's formal identity is not equivalent
to actual notice and would be insufficient to establish a lender's usurious
intent.40 2
4. Choice of Law Clause. High Fashion Wigs Profits Sharing Trust v.
Hamilton Investment Trust403 held that parties to a loan transaction can
stipulate the state law that will govern the transaction for all purposes,
including the applicable usury limitation. In that case the plaintiffs were
two Oklahoma employee benefit trusts that had contracted for no personal
572 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, no writ). See also, Wallenstein
& St. Claire, Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 28, 46 (1976); Student Sym-
posium-A Study of Texas Usury Law (pt. 2), 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 852, 877 (1979); Comment,
Incorporation to A void the Usury Laws, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1390 (1968); Comment, Using a
"Dummy" Corporate Borrower Creates Usury and Tax Dilculties, 28 Sw. L.J. 437 (1974);
Note, Incorporationfor the Purposes of Borrowing at an Otherwise Usurious Rate of Interest.
Skeen v. Glenn Justice Mortgage Co., 32 Sw. L.J. 959 (1975). But cf. Carr Well Service, Inc.
v. Skytop Rig Co., 582 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.) (statu-
tory exception for higher corporate rate not applicable if not agreed to by debtor).
400. 581 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
401. Id. at 704 (citing American Century Mortgage Investors, 529 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref d n.r.e.), in which a partnership similarly attempted to assert
usury on grounds that it, and not the corporate borrower, was the equitable owner of the
land).
402. 581 S.W.2d at 703.
403. 579 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, no writ).
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liability loans providing for interest in excess of ten percent per annum 404
with a Massachusetts real estate investment trust to finance two projects to
be constructed in Texas. The plaintiffs brought suit in Texas, alleging
usury and seeking to recover the statutory penalities.40 5 Noting that the
deed of trust, assignment of rents, guaranty of completion, and guaranty of
payment relating to one of the projects and both the notes and loan agree-
ments provided that they would be governed by the law of Oklahoma, the
court observed that a transaction bearing a reasonable relation both to
Texas and to another state may, by agreement of the parties, be governed
by the law of the other state.406 In this case, although the financing related
to Texas projects, the loans were negotiated in Oklahoma and New Jersey
and closed in New Jersey. Disbursements under the loan agreements were
made in Oklahoma, interest statements were mailed to the borrower's of-
fice in Oklahoma, and debt service payments were sent to the lender's of-
fice in New Jersey. Based on the facts presented at trial, the lower court
concluded that the State of Oklahoma bore a reasonable relationship to
the parties and the transaction. 40 7 Consequently, the contractual stipula-
tions were effective and the higher interest ceiling of Oklahoma, 40 8 rather
than that of Texas, applied.409
5. Guarantors. The proposition that a guarantor is precluded from as-
serting a defense of usury4 10 was reconfirmed this survey period. In Lawler
v. Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corp.4 11 the Dallas court of civil appeals
held that in a suit to enjoin foreclosure under a deed of trust executed by
the trustee of a family trust to secure a loan to a corporation, the plaintiff
trustee was in actuality a guarantor of the secured note and therefore
barred from invoking the usury penalties.412 In reaching this conclusion,
the court relied on Universal Metals & Machinery, Inc. v. Bohart,413 a 1976
Texas Supreme Court decision, and the plain language of section 2.09 of
article 1302,4 4 which expressly prohibits a corporation, its successors,
guarantors, or assigns from asserting a claim or defense of usury based on
the higher corporate rate. Similarly, in Houston Sash & Door Co. v.
404. The initial stated rate of 5% over the Chase Manhattan Bank prime rate was
amended to provide for 12% interest and a percentage of rentals from its properties. Id. at
301.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 302; see TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 1.105(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
407. 579 S.W.2d at 302.
408. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 266 (1966). See generally 12 MORTGAGE & REAL EST.
EXECUTIVES REP., Oct. 15, 1979, table of state usury limits.
409. See also Southwest Park Outpatient Surgery, Ltd v. Chandler Leasing Div., 572
S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1978, no writ) (court held that even if equip-
ment lease was in actuality a conditional sales contract, lessee's usury defense was untenable
because lease provided that Massachusetts law, which provides maximum 20% interest,
would govern).
410. See Student Symposium, supra note 382, at 875.
411. 583 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
412. Id. at 812.
413. 539 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. 1976). See also Heath & Bentley, Real Property, Annual Sur-
vey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 27, 66-67 (1977).
414. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1979).
19801
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
Heaner415 the court strictly construed the language of section 1.06 of arti-
cle 5069, providing that the prescribed penalties are to be forfeited to the
"obligor, ' ' 4 16 to conclude that the defense of usury was unavailable to the
estate of a guarantor of the corporate debtor.4 1 7
6. Legislation. The most significant change in the usury law this survey
period came not from the courts but from the legislature. The ceiling rate
for residential dwellings was increased,418 and the floor amount for loans
entitled to corporate rates was reduced.41 9 In addition, the penalty to lend-
ers exacting usurious interest rates was substantially decreased.420 Other
changes restructured disclosure provisions in the small loan context.
42
'
Effective August 27, 1979, newly enacted article 5069-1.07(d)422 pro-
vides that certain loans secured by real property may carry a maximum
legal interest charge of up to the lesser of twelve percent per annum or two
percent per annum in excess of a posted based rate.4 23 The savings and
loan commissioner is directed to publish the applicable base rate in the
Texas Register.4 24 Only those loans made before the legislation's Septem-
ber 1, 1981, termination date, secured in whole or in part by a lien, mort-
gage, security interest, or other interest on which is located one or more
single family dwellings or residential units for up to four families, are eligi-
ble for the revised interest rate. Any lender charging interest pursuant to
the section in excess of ten percent is prohibited from charging a prepay-
415. 577 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. 1979). The potentially disruptive holding in this case that a
creditor who charges interest on an open account during the calendar year in which the
account is made is liable for statutory usury penalties was circumvented by the legislature
with the amendment of TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon Pam Supp.
1971-1979). See also Oppenheimer, The Open Account in Texas in Light ofHouston Sash, 10
ST. MARY'S L.J. 705 (1979).
416. 577 S.W.2d at 222 (citing Micrea, Inc. v. Eureka Life Ins. Co. of America, 534
S.W.2d 348, 354 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ refd n.r.e.)) (court reasoned that
individual guarantor of corporate debtor, who had not paid usurious interest and whose
contract with lender did not provide for usurious interest, cannot avoid liability as guarantor
on grounds that principal debtor had paid interest in excess of legal rates).
417. 577 S.W.2d at 222. But cf Rickman v. American Mortgage Corp., 583 F.2d 155 (5th
Cir. 1978), discussed at text accompanying notes 394-95 supra, in which the court expressed
uncertainty as to the meaning of "obligor." The issue in that case was whether the maker of
a no personal liability note on which he had made no payments could alternatively assert a
right to usury penalties under the statute as an "obligor." The court observed that, although
a guarantor "would probably be denied the benefit of usury laws," if the makers were denied
the opportunity to sue, no party would be able to challenge the allegedly usurious practices
of the lender. Id. at 157 n.3.
418. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(d)(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1979).
419. Id. art. 5069-1.07(b).
420. Id. art. 5069-1.06(1).
421. Id. art. 5069-3.19 to -3.20.
422. Id. art. 5069-1.07(d).
423. The base rate, to be posted by the savings and loan commissioner, is determined
from the average per annum market yield rate adjusted to constant maturities on ten-year
Treasury notes and bonds, as published by the board of governors of the Federal Reserve
System, for the second calendar month preceding the month in which the lender became
legally bound to make the loan. The additional 2% per annum is to be rounded off to the
nearest quarter of 1% per annum. Id. art. 5069-1.07(d)(1).
424. Id. art. 5069-1.07(d)(2).
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ment charge or penalty, unless such charge or penalty is required by fed-
eral law.425 The savings and loan section of the finance commission and
the savings and loan commissioner are directed to promulgate rules and
regulations setting out the procedure by which variable interest rate real
estate loans by savings and loan associations will be subject to the Texas
Savings and Loan Act.426
Any financial institution that discriminates in its loan program is pro-
hibited from charging interest on such loans in excess of ten percent. 427
Though poorly drafted, the statute defines discrimination to include con-
sideration of race, color, religion, sex, marital status, national origin or
ancestry of the applicant.4 28 Consideration by the financial institution of
the composition of the surrounding neighborhood or geographic area in
terms of race, ethnicity, religion, or national origin or of the stability of
that composition in its decision to provide financial assistance and in the
appraisal of the property is likewise forbidden.4 29 Finally, evaluation of
conditions, characteristics, or trends in the property's neighborhood is pro-
hibited unless demonstrably necessary to avoid unsafe or unsound busi-
ness practice.430
The immediate impact of article 5069-1.07(d) has been significantly at-
tenuated, however, by the passage of H.R. 4998.431 This federal legislation
explicity overrides state constitutional and statutory limitations on interest
rates and other charges relating to loans secured by a first lien on residen-
tial real property. Any loan, mortgage, or advance made prior to the
March 31, 1980, expiration date, and any commitment issued prior to the
expiration date and exercised within two years thereafter is subject to the
usury override. Thus, the operation of new article 5069-1.07(d) is effec-
tively suspended until April 1, 1980.
Subection (b) of article 5069-1.07 formerly provided that a lender of
principal in excess of $500,000 to be secured by an interest in real property
could charge interest up to a maximum of eighteen percent.432 Prospec-
tively from August 29, 1979, the minimum loan amount has been reduced
to $250,000 in the aggregate of all contracted or contemplated advances.433
Moreover, any extensions or renewals of an originally qualifying loan can
carry an eighteen percent contractual charge, even though the outstanding
principal balance has been reduced below $250,000. 4 3 4 Rather than limit-
ing the eligible loans to those for interim construction financing or refi-
nancing of improved real property, the new section disqualifies from its
425. Id. art. 5069-1.07(d)(4).
426. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 715, § 2, at 1766. The Texas Savings and Loan Act is
codified at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 852a (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1980).




431. Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-161, 93 Stat. 1233.
432. 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 26, § 1, at 48.
433. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(b) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1979).
434. Id.
1980]
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provisions only those loans to be secured by a single one-to-four family
residence to be occupied by the borrower and those to be secured by land
used primarily for agricultural or ranching purposes. By broadening the
range of eligible loans, the amendment obviates much of the prior confu-
sion generated by the statute's restrictive language. It is now unnecessary
to consider whether the portion of a loan attributable to land acquisition
costs constitutes interim construction financing, or whether the application
of improved property refinancing proceeds to nonrelated property consti-
tutes refinancing of improved real property.435 Additionally, the amend-
ment's recital that it is not intended to limit or otherwise affect the
corporate interest statute clearly establishes that a corporate borrower of
an amount less than $250,000 but more than $5,000436 may still validly be
charged up to eighteen percent interest. The reduction in the floor amount
of the large loan provision should significantly reduce the need for the
corporate subterfuge, however.437
Perhaps one of the most far-reaching changes of this past legislative ses-
sion is the significant reduction in penalties for usurious interest charges.
Formerly, a lender could be held liable for twice the total amount of "in-
terest contracted for, charged or received. ' 438 Subsection (1) of article
5069-1.06439 now limits the penalty to three times the difference between
the maximum allowable interest and the total interest contracted for,
charged, or received. The amendment also sets the minimum recoverable
penalty at the lesser of $2,000 or twenty percent of the principal. The
harsher penalty of subsection 2, providing for forfeiture of principal if the
contracted, charged, or received interest is more than twice the legal
amount remains the same, however. The new usury penalty applies only
to claims made after August 29, 1979, and not to those currently in litiga-
tion. By lightening the penalty on current loans, however, this new state
legislation may help to ease some of the strain on a money market that has
moved entirely beyond the state's influence.
Chapter 5 of article 5069,440 dealing with secondary mortgages, has been
refined in several significant aspects. Section 4 of article 5.02, which for-
merly dealt exclusively with prepayment by the borrower, has been ex-
panded to cover acceleration by the lender. This expansion clears up
previous uncertainty concerning the manner in which the lender must re-
bate unearned interest on acceleration of a note. The section now provides
that the rebate is to be based on the ratio of installments yet to be paid to
435. See Roberts, The Revised4rticle 5069-1.07(b), 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 699, 701 (1979).
By directly specifying the applicable interest rate, the amendment eliminates cross-referenc-
ing to the corporate rate statute, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon Pam.
Supp. 1963-1979). Previous concern as to the legality of nonprofit corporations paying inter-
est in excess of 10% is clearly eliminated by the amendment's broad definition of person.
See Roberts, supra, at 702.
436. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1979).
437. See text accompanying notes 399-402 supra.
438. 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 274, § 2, at 610.
439. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1979).
440. Id. arts. 5069-5.01 -. 05.
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total scheduled installments.44 The authorized charges itemized in sub-
section 5 have also been expanded and modified. Specific allowance for
court costs44 2 and the reasonable cost of repossession, storage, preparation,
and sale of any security443 has been made. Fees for the filing, recording, or
releasing of a security interest, 44 and official fees for construction per-
mits,44 5 as well as the cost of title insurance or title examination,446 are
preserved as a legitimate expense. Formerly limited to $35, 447 legal fees of
independent attorneys for preparation of related documents are now re-




Any attorney's fees assessed by a court are also considered a legitimate
expense.44 9 Outlays for ascertainment of an applicant's credit risk, for-
merly limited to $12.50, and appraisal and inspection fees, formerly lim-
ited to $25 per parcel of land, 450 have similarly been subjected to the more
flexible "reasonable and necessary" guideline, provided that the servicing
parties are not employees of the lender.45' The lender's disclosure obliga-
tions also have been significantly reduced. A lender need only indicate if it
is requiring,452 not requesting, insurance. 453 The information required in
the statement to be delivered to the borrower along with copies of the note
and underlying documents has been limited to the names and addresses of
the parties and the types of insurance for which a specified charge is in-
cluded in the loan contract. 454
Home improvement lenders and sellers will be affected by the amend-
ments to chapter 6 of article 5069,455 governing retail installment sales.
That chapter formerly included various fees and costs associated with re-
tail installment transactions involving modernization, rehabilitation, re-
pair, alteration, improvement, or construction of real property within the
definition of cash sale price.456 These are now designated as itemized
charges457 that, aggregated with the cash sale price (defined as the actual
contract price), less any down payment, constitute the principal balance.
Title insurance or examination charges and official filing fees are main-
tained as itemized charges, and the dollar ceilings on the amount of ap-
praisals and inspection, credit investigation, and preparation of legal
documents by nonemployees that may be included within the principal
441. Id. art. 5069-5.02(4).
442. Id. art. 5069-5.02(5)(i).
443. Id. art. 5069-5.02(5)(iv).
444. Id. art. 5069-5.02(5)(iii).
445. Id. art. 5069-5.02(5)(vii).
446. Id. art. 5069-5.02(5)(v).
447. 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 274, § 2, at 632.
448. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-5.02(5)(vii) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1979).
449. Id. art. 5069-5.02(5)(ii).
450. 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 274, § 2, at 632.
451. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-5.02(5)(vii) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1979).
452. Id. art. 5069-5.03(3).
453. 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 274, § 2, at 634.
454. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-5.04(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1979).
455. Id. arts. 5069-6.01 -. 08.
456. 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 274, § 2, at 636.
457. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069--6.010) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1979).
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balance as itemized charges have been removed. All itemized charges, in-
cluding fees incurred in filing the security instrument or license and title
registration, permitted insurance premiums, taxes, and any other legally
prescribed fees must now be disclosed in the retail installment contract. 458
As in the second mortgage context, any refund credit is to be applied in the
same manner as a voluntary prepayment in the event of the holder's accel-
eration.459 Moreover, after such an acceleration the parties may reinstate
and amend the contract. 460 Additionally, the parties may now agree to
more than one amendment to extend or defer installment deadlines.461
The newly enacted chapter 6A462 to article 5069 governs the credit sale
of mobile and nonmobile homes previously regulated by chapters 7 and 6,
respectively. Significantly, modular homes that are "transportable in one
or more sections . . . eight body feet or more in width and . . .32 body
feet or more in length . . .manufactured at a location other than the
homesite . . .designed to be a single-family or multifamily residence
[when delivered to and connected with utilities at the homesite] '463 are
also covered. New manufactured homes financed over five years or less
may bear a maximum time price differential charge of $7.50 per $100 per
year;464 resold homes a maximum charge of $10 per $100 per year.4 65 Any
manufactured home to be financed over a period greather than five years
may bear a maximum time differential charge determined under the above
formula or a charge computed by applying the true annual interest rate
resulting from application of the $7.50 per $100 per year charge for a term
of five years, to the outstanding balance at the time of each payment.466
The sale contract must disclose more items than the ordinary retail sale
contract governed by chapter 6, including finance and other charges, and
the actual amount financed. 467 Chapter 6A also contains provisions for
customer prepayment, 468 amendment, 469 insurance, 470 limitation on trans-
fer charges, 47' and requirement of notice of default prior to accelera-
tion.472
Finally, the legislature repealed chapter 14,473 which authorized the Fi-
nance Commission of Texas to prescribe alternative consumer credit dis-
closure regulations in coordination with federal law.474 Presumably the
458. Id. art. 5069-6.02(5).
459. Id. art. 5069-6.02(10).
460. Id. art. 5069-6.02(10)(b).
461. Id. art. 5069--6.02(12)(a).
462. Id. arts. 5069-6A.01 to .14.
463. Id. art. 5069-6A.02(A).
464. Id. art. 5069-6A.03(A)(i).
465. Id. art. 5069-6A.03(A)(2).
466. Id. art. 5069-6A.03(A)(3).
467. Id. art. 5069-6A.04.
468. Id. art. 5069--6A.05.
469. Id. art. 5069-6A.06.
470. Id. art. 5069-6A.07.
471. Id. art. 5069-6A.08.
472. Id. art. 5069-6A.09.
473. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 672, § 51, at 1595.
474. 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 184, § i, at 421.
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gap between the disclosure provisions of other chapters of article 5069 and
of federal regulations has been significantly reduced.
IV. MECHANICS' AND MATERIALMEN'S LIENS
A. Inception, Attachment, and Priority of Liens
The most significant mechanics' and materialmen's lien case decided
during the survey period was Diversified Mortgage Investors v. Lloyd D.
Blaylock General Contractor, Inc. 475 a lien priority contest between con-
tractor and lender that provided the Texas Supreme Court with an oppor-
tunity to construe article 5459(2)(a). 476 The statute provides that a
mechanic's lien has its inception upon "[t]he actual commencement of con-
struction of the improvements or the delivery of the material to the land
upon which the improvements are to be located for use thereon . . pro-
vided such commencement or material is actually visible from inspection
of the land . . . .477 Lloyd D. Blaylock General Contractor, Inc.
(Blaylock) entered into negotiations with Dollar Inns of America, Inc.
(Dollar Inns) for the construction of two motels on two separate parcels,
one located in Fort Worth (Fort Worth Parcel), and the other in Irving
(Irving Parcel). Pursuant to preliminary construction agreements between
Blaylock and Dollar Inns, Blaylock began work on each of the parcels
after Dollar Inns obtained executed contracts of sale covering the parcels,
but before Dollar Inns had acquired title to the parcels. On the Fort
Worth Parcel Blaylock performed job site engineering work and topo-
graphical survey work,478 procured the delivery of lumber with which it
erected batter boards, 479 delivered and spread fill dirt on the job site, be-
gan excavation for a retaining wall, and erected a sign on the site indicat-
ing that a Dollar Inns motel was being constructed thereon. All of this
activity occurred prior to the closing of the purchase of the parcel by Dol-
lar Inns and prior to the filing of the deed of trust by Dollar Inns' construc-
tion lender.480 The court of civil appeals48' held that the essential inquiry
in determining the inception of a mechanic's lien under article 5459(2)(a)
was whether construction activity and materials were visible on the site
475. 576 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1978). For a more extensive treatment of this case, see Note,
33 Sw. L.J. 763 (1979).
476. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5459(2)(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
477. Id. For a general discussion of the treatment of the "commencement of construc-
tion" issue in other jurisdictions, see Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 822 (1965), and cases cited therein.
478. This work involved the placement of approximately 150 wooden stakes and eight
iron rods at various points to lay out the future location of drives, grades, and building sites.
These stakes and rods stood visibly one to three feet above the ground.
479. Batter boards are "L" shaped wooden forms that are erected for the purpose of
defining the future location of the comers of the building.
480. 576 S.W.2d at 797. For a chronological chart of the construction and financing
activities on both the Fort Worth and Irving Parcels, see Lloyd D. Blaylock Gen. Contrac-
tor, Inc. v. Dollar Inns of America, Inc., 548 S.W.2d 924, 929 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977).
481. Lloyd D. Blaylock Gen. Contractor, Inc. v. Dollar Inns of America, Inc., 548
S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977), rev'd in part, afrd in part as modified sub nom.




such that a person, upon inspection of the land, would be put on notice
that construction work had begun on the land.4 82 The court further found
that all items delivered to the site satisfied the statutory definition of
"materials" when measured by the liberal rule of construction applied in
mechanics' lien cases.483 Therefore, the court of appeals ruled that
Blaylock's lien on both parcels had its inception under the statute prior to
the filing of the deed of trust and was accordingly the superior lien.
On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's em-
phasis on the visibility standard, and considered the fulfillment of the stat-
utory definition of "improvement" 484 and "material" 485 to be essential in
determining the inception of a mechanic's lien. The court ruled that the
only activities that constitute "commencement of construction" for pur-
poses of inception of a lien under article 5459(2)(a) are activities meeting
the definition of "improvement" in article 5452(1), by reason of the fact
that they involve the placement of articles of permanent value on the
land.486 The court also stated that inception may be based on delivery of
materials only if the materials are to be incorporated into or consumed in
the direct prosecution of the work itself.487 Since all of the activities that
occurred on, and all materials delivered to, the Fort Worth Parcel prior to
acquisition of the property by Dollar Inns and the filing of the lender's
deed of trust were of a preliminary nature and did not contribute to a
permanent improvement, Blaylock's lien on the parcel did not have its in-
ception prior to the filing of the deed of trust and was thus an inferior lien.
On the other hand, some of the construction activities and delivery of
materials to the Irving Parcel before the filing of the deed of trust were
sufficient to cause the inception of Blaylock's lien. These activities in-
cluded not only the kind of activities carried out on the Fort Worth Parcel
but also general site clearance and excavation (including removal of sev-
eral large trees), removal of a swimming pool, acquisition of a building
permit, delivery of concrete section pipe, and commencement of work on
the foundation.488 The sum of these factors was sufficient to support the
482. 548 S.W.2d at 931.
483. Id See also Hayek v. Western Steel Co., 478 S.W.2d 786, 795 (Tex. 1972).
484. Under TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5452(1) (Vernon Supp. 1980), "improve-
ment" is defined to include,
abutting sidewalks and streets and utilities therein; clearing, grubbing, drain-
ing or fencing of land; wells, cisterns, tanks, reservoirs or artificial lakes or
pools made for supplying or storing water; all pumps, siphons, and windmills
or other machinery or apparatus used for raising water for stock, domestic use,
or for irrigation purposes; and the planting of orchard trees, grubbing out of
orchards and replacing trees, and pruning said orchard trees.
485. Under TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5452(2) (Vernon Supp. 1980), "material"
includes "material, machinery, fixtures or tools incorporated in the work, or consumed in the
direct prosecution of the work, or ordered and delivered for such incorporation or such
consumption."
486. 576 S.W.2d at 802. The court pointed out that under most circumstances, the initial
activities that will constitute "commencement of construction" will entail the excavation for,
or laying of, the foundation. Id.
487. Id. at 803.
488. Id. at 799.
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inception of a lien since the foundation work indicated commencement of
construction of the final structure into which the concrete pipes would be
incorporated. The court also noted that the removal of trees and clearing
of the land were sufficient in themselves to establish inception of the lien
under the statutory definition of "improvement." The opinion did not,
however, develop a precise definition of the activities constituting "clear-
ing" or "grubbing" under the statute. Many unanswered questions re-
main. For example, when trees are necessarily or incidentally removed by
the operation of earth-moving equipment to spread fill dirt, does this con-
stitute "clearing"? Does the removal of grass, weeds, and brush constitute
"clearing and grubbing" under the statute? If not, how does one determine
whether vegetation is "brush" or "trees"? The safest course for a construc-
tion lender continues to be filing of the deed of trust prior to the delivery of
any materials to, or the commencement of any preliminary construction
activities on, the building site. Otherwise, when some activity has oc-
curred, the lender will frequently not know with certainty whether or not
its lien has priority.
An additional requirement for the inception of a mechanic's lien is that
there be some interest to which the lien may attach. At the time of the
commencement of construction on and delivery of material to the Irving
Parcel, Dollar Inns had contracted to purchase the property but did not
actually hold title. The Blaylock court applied the doctrine of "after-ac-
quired title" to hold that the statutory lien attaches to an equitable interest
in the land under the contract of sale, and automatically expands to in-
clude the entire fee simple interest when the owner later acquires such
interest.489 Therefore, even though a lender's deed of trust is executed and
filed on the day the borrower acquires the property, the lender's deed of
trust and vendor's liens may nevertheless be inferior to a statutory lien that
has previously attached to the borrower's equitable interest in the land.
This decision thus casts doubt upon the traditionally perceived effective-
ness490 of vendor's liens as significant protection against mechanic's liens
arising through the borrower.
The lender in Blaylock was not totally unsuccessful even as to the Irving
Parcel, however, since the court held that the lender's deed of trust lien on
the Irving Parcel was equitably subrogated to a previously existing ven-
dor's lien on the property securing indebtedness that was refinanced at
closing with proceeds of the purchase money loan.49' Thus, Dollar Inns'
lender had a first and prior lien under the deed of trust to the extent of the
489. Id. at 806.
490. See Irving Lumber Co. v. Ailtex Mortgage Co., 468 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1971); Young-
blood, Mechanics' and Materialmen's Liens in Texas, 26 Sw. L.J. 665, 692 (1972). For a
general discussion of the creation and attachment of vendor's liens, see Norvell, The Ven-
dor's Lien and Reservation of the Paramount Legal Title-The Rights of Vendors, Vendees,
andSubvendees, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 22 (1965).
491. 576 S.W.2d at 807. This portion of the court's opinion replaces a portion of the
court's original Blaylock opinion (21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 521 (July 30, 1978)), which was with-
drawn. In the withdrawn opinion, the court had held that when a lender has a deed of trust
lien and is also subrogated to a preexisting vendor's lien, it must elect which of its remedies
19801
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
indebtedness secured by the prior vendor's lien to which it was subrogated,
but Blaylock was entitled to satisfy its mechanic's lien from all proceeds of
the foreclosure sale under the deed of trust in excess of the amount of such
vendor's lien.492
In Centex Materials, Inc. v. Dalton493 a materialman filed a statutory
lien affidavit under article 545 3,494 claiming a lien on two noncontiguous
lots in a subdivision to secure payment for concrete delivered to one of the
two lots but allegedly used by the contractor in construction activities on
both lots. The materialman then sought to foreclose on one of the lots.
Distinguishing Guarantee Saving, Loan & Investment Co. v. Cash,495 the
court determined that the materialman was not entitled to foreclosure of a
statutory or a constitutional lien against either lot, because the lien affida-
vit was filed on two noncontinguous lots and the materialman had failed to
specify what portions of the delivered materials were used on the separate
lots. 496 The rule thus established is that when materials are delivered to a
contractor for use on adjacent lots, the lien may attach to all the lots, as it
would be unreasonable to expect the materialman to ascertain which
materials were used for construction on which lots, but if the lots are sepa-
rated by intervening lots the materialman must prove which materials
were delivered to and used on a particular lot in order to establish his lien
against that lot. While this rule may be appropriate where the noncontigu-
ous lots are widely separated, the result seems unfair to the materialman in
the context of subdivision development, since the materialman normally
has no reasonable way to ascertain whether materials are to be used on the
particular lot to which they are delivered or in construction of one of the
several similar buildings under construction nearby.
B. Trust Fund Statute
In Berger Engineering Co. v. Village Casuals, Inc. 497 a subcontractor who
had failed to perfect his subcontractor's lien under article 5453498 at-
tempted to impress a trust under article 5472(e)499 on certain funds being
held by the owner as a result of a dispute between the owner and the origi-
nal contractor.50° The court found, with little discussion, that the funds
it will pursue, and its foreclosure of the deed of trust lien constitutes a waiver of its vendor's
lien rights.
492. See Habitat, Inc. v. McKanna, 523 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, no
writ).
493. 574 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ).
494. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5453 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
495. 99 Tex. 555, 91 S.W. 781 (1906) (a lien may attach to several contiguous lots when
the materialman is unable to determine which materials were used on which lots).
496. 574 S.W.2d at 624.
497. 576 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ).
498. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5453 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
499. Id. art. 5472e.
500. Id. art. 5472e(l) provides:
All moneys or funds paid to a contractor or subcontractor..., under a con-
struction contract for the improvement of specific real property in this state,
and allfunds borrowed by a contractor, subcontractor, owner,. . . for the pur-
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withheld by the owner were neither held by the contractor nor borrowed
by the contractor for construction purposes, and thus no trust was im-
pressed thereon for the benefit of the subcontractor. 50' The subcontrac-
tor's attempts to obtain relief from the owner under a quantum meruit
theory50 2 and under a claimed constitutional lien 503 were also unsuccess-
ful, leaving the subcontractor without a remedy against the owner.
C. Whirlpool Doctrine
First National Bank v. Whiropool-5 and its progeny established the rule
that a materialman's lien is superior to the lien of a prior deed of trust to
the extent of improvements supplied by the lien claimant which have not
yet been incorporated into the structure or, if previously incorporated, can
be removed without injury to the remaining structure. The claimant bears
the burden of identifying and segregating the materials supplied by him,
and his lien attaches only to the segregated materials.505 The materialman
in In re Jamai50 6 asserted that since the materials supplied were fungible
goods and were thus incapable of proper identification or segregation, the
court should create a "fungible goods" exception to the segregation and
identification requirement to prevent a contractor from evading the Whirl-
pool rule by commingling fungible materials with similar materials of
other suppliers, either intentionally or in the ordinary course of construc-
tion. While noting the logic of the materialman's argument, the federal
court was unable to find support for the position in Texas case law, and
was unwilling unilaterally to create an exception to the established Whirl-
pool doctrine.507 Despite the reluctance of the federal court to create state
law, a Texas state court may be willing to create such a "fungible goods"
exception in a properly presented case, since without such an exception the
Whirlpool preference is unavailable to suppliers of common building
materials such as lumber, wallboard, or plywood, even though the materi-
pose of improving such real property which are secured. . . by a lien on the
specific property. . . are hereby declared to be Trust Funds for the benefit of
. . . subcontractors. . . who. . . furnish labor or material for the construc-
tion or repair of any . . . improvement whatever upon such real property
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5472e(l) (Vernon Supp. 1980) (emphasis added).
501. 576 S.W.2d at 651-52. The court did not elaborate on whether the funds in question
had been borrowed by the owner for construction purposes, or, if they had been, whether the
result would have been different.
502. The court rejected the quantum meruit theory because there was no implied agree-
ment between the owner and the contractor that the owner would pay the subcontractor for
the benefits received by the owner, citing Crockett v. Brady, 455 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1970, no writ), and Crockett v. Sampson, 439 S.W.2d 355, 358 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1969, no writ). 576 S.W.2d at 652.
503. Under established law, the constitutional lien provided by TEX. CONST. art. XVI,
§ 37, is not available to subcontractors. See Da-Col. Paint Mfg. Co. v. American Indem.
Co., 517 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1974).
504. 517 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1974).
505. Kaspar v. Cockrell-Riggins Lighting Co., 511 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. Civ. App.-East-
land 1974, no writ).
506. 471 F. Supp. 441 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
507. Id. at 444.
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als may not have been incorporated into the structure at the time the claim
is raised. So long as the supplier is able to prove the quantity of such items
delivered to the site, no legitimate purpose seems to be served by the addi-
tional requirement that the supplier be able to segregate the exact items he
supplied in order to enforce his lien. 508
D. Contractual Liens
The contractor in Taylor v. Rigby509 had no statutory lien, because he
had filed only his construction contract and failed to file a lien affidavit as
required by the statute.5 10  The contract was acknowledged but not
"sworn" as required by the statute and was thus insufficient to establish a
statutory lien.51' The contract between the contractor and the landowner
did, however, purport to grant the contractor a contractual lien to secure
his payment. After the contractor had begun work, the owner ceased pay-
ments, at which time the contractor stopped work and obtained a $30,000
default judgment against the landowner. In the meantime, the property
was transferred by foreclosure sale to new owners, against whom the con-
tractor sought to foreclose his claimed contractual lien. The new owners
were successful in their defense. Since the wording of the contract pro-
vided a contractual lien only for substantial performance, and the contrac-
tor had ceased work prior to substantially discharging his obligations
under the contract, the judgment against the former owner was in the na-
ture of a quantum meruit recovery, for which there is no lien.5 12 The deci-
sion was also supported on the grounds that the contractor had waived his
lien claim by failing to assert it in his suit against the original owner.
51 3
V. LANDLORD AND TENANT
A. Rents and Their Payment
1. Landlord's Seizure of Property on Leased Premises. Most residential
508. One difficulty in the application of a fungible goods exception to the Whir/pool
doctrine, as noted by the Jamail court, 471 F. Supp. at 444, would be the treatment of the
situation in which a variety of materialmen claim liens on material whose source would be
impossible to determine. A possible solution would be to grant all materialmen supplying
the particular fungible good involved a pro rata recovery.
509. 574 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
510. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5453(I) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
511. See Perkins v. Crittenden, 462 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. 1970).
512. The court pointed out that even if the statutory lien had been properly perfected by
the filing of an affidavit, it would have given the contractor no greater protection, since the
statutory lien is only available upon substantial performance of the lien contract. 574
S.W.2d at 837. See also Continental Nat'l Bank v. Conner, 147 Tex. 218, 228, 214 S.W.2d
928, 934 (1948).
513. The contractor argued that he was entitled to bring separate claims on the debt and
on the lien securing payment thereof. The court held, however, that while separate actions
may be maintained when a debt and a lien are represented by separate instruments (such as
a promissory note and a separate security instrument), a mechanic's lien is necessarily impli-
cated in any claim for payment for work performed under the lien contract. Thus, if the lien
is not raised in the same action with any claim for payment of amounts owed under the
contract, the claim for a lien is waived. 574 S.W.2d at 839 (citing University Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Security Lumber Co., 423 S.W.2d 287, 292 (Tex. 1967)).
[Vol. 34
REAL PROPERTY
leases give the landlord the right to take possession of a tenant's nonex-
empt property upon a failure to pay rent. Two recent Texas cases high-
light the limits of this right. In Jay Fikes & Associates v. Walton514 the
lease provided that in the event of a default, the landlord could take pos-
session of the tenant's personal property upon five days written notice. Al-
though the tenant was not in default and had not received notice, the
landlord's manager entered the tenant's apartment and seized certain per-
sonal property. The tenant brought suit for conversion 5' 5 and sought ex-
emplary treble damages. The landlord brought a cross action, alleging
that the tenant owed back rent. On appeal the Walton court addressed
three issues: the valuation of the converted property, the sufficiency of the
evidence to justify exemplary damages, and the tenant's entitlement to re-
cover attorney's fees.
In valuing the converted property, the court rejected the landlord's posi-
tion that market value should be used to set the tenant's damages, and
instead accepted the tenant's argument that the converted property had a
particular value to her that should be the measure of damages., 1 6 Al-
though the court's acceptance of this valuation is inadequately explained
and supported, the landlord's apparent willful disregard for his tenant's
rights and property may have influenced the court to treat him harshly.
The egregious nature of the landlord's conduct was also a factor in the
court's decision to uphold the award of exemplary damages, since the stan-
dard for awarding exemplary damages requires proof of gross negli-
gence. 517
The attorneys' fee issue raised an entirely different question. Generally,
attorneys' fees in Texas are not recoverable in tort or contract unless pro-
vided for by statute or written contract.51 8 Although the lease was silent
with respect to attorneys' fees, the tenant argued that recovery of the fees
was authorized pursuant to section 7 of article 5236d. 519 The court re-
jected this argument because the tenant's pleadings were grounded solely
in conversion and did not invoke the statute.
Conversion was also alleged in Stein v. Mauricio.5 20 In that case, the
tenant had allowed appellant to place two jukeboxes on the leased prem-
ises. Thereafter, when the tenant failed to pay his rent and vacated the
premises, appellant sought return of the jukeboxes. The landlord refused,
arguing that appellant had not sufficiently proved his ownership rights.
514. 578 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
515. The tenant did not alternatively seek the remedies available under TEX. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 5236d, § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1980), which provides: "Upon willful violation of
this Article by the landlord or his agent, the tenant may recover one month's rent, plus
actual damages, plus reasonable attorney's fees, less any delinquent rentals or other sums for
which the tenant is liable."
516. The tenant's own testimony was the court's sole evidence in valuing the converted
property.
517. Bennett v. Howard, 141 Tex. 101, 170 S.W.2d 709 (1943).
518. Bray v. Curtis, 544 S.W.2d 816, 820 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Buck v. Johnson, 495 S.W.2d 291, 297 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973, no writ).
519. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5236d, § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1980); see note 515 supra.
520. 580 S.W.2d 82 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ).
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Appellant filed an action for conversion that resulted in a judgment for the
landlord. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the landlord's abso-
lute denial of appellant's property right constituted an act of conversion as
a matter of law.52 '
2. Existence of the Rent Obligation. In Edward Bankers & Co. v. Spra-
dlin522 an office-space tenant vacated the leased premises midway through
the term of a five-year lease and entered into a new lease with the same
landlord for a larger office in the same building. When the tenant changed
quarters, he stopped paying rent on his old space. The landlord sought
recovery of rent for the smaller office space, contending that the tenant had
not been released from the lease and that the building manager was not
authorized to release the tenant. The landlord's arguments were summa-
rily rejected by the Spradlin court. The court noted that the general rule in
Texas is that lease obligations are terminated when the tenant surrenders
the premises and the landlord accepts possession.5 23 The tenant is not re-
quired to secure a written release prior to the termination of his obliga-
tions; the release may be implied by the landlord's actions. Therefore,
since the tenant was assured by the landlord's manager that he had no
obligation to pay rent pursuant to his earlier lease, his obligation to pay
rent had terminated.
In State v. City National Bank524 a bank had leased space to the State
Commission for the Blind. The lease provided that "[i]n the event Lessee
shall be in default in payment of rentals . . .Lessor shall have the...
remedies now or hereafter provided by law for recovery of rent, reposses-
sion of the premises and damages occasioned by such default." 525 The
lease term ended, but the commission did not vacate, because it had not
secured new quarters due to complicated governmental procedures for
leasing space.526 The bank brought suit against the state, the commission,
and its executive director when the state refused to pay rent during the
holdover period. The state argued, inter alia, that since there was no writ-
ten contract for the holdover period between itself and the bank, the claim
of the bank arose out of a transaction that had not been provided for by
preexisting law, and therefore the state was prohibited from making pay-
521. Id. at 83.
522. 575 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ).
523. Id. at 586.
524. 578 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979). After the survey period ended, the
supreme court affirmed this decision. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 205 (Feb. 9, 1980).
525. 578 S.W.2d at 159.
526. At the time involved in these facts, a state agency had to satisfy the terms of 1943
Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 258, at 385, in seeking rental space. The statute required the particular
state agency to submit an application for space with the State Board of Control. If sufficient
money had been appropriated by the legislature, the board would then advertise for bids for
the space. The board was required to accept the lowest and best bid and the attorney gen-
eral would prepare a contract for the space. In the instant case, the board's lowest and best
bid was unacceptable to the commission, and thus, the commission was forced to hold over
its office space in the bank. Article 666b was repealed shortly after the City National deci-
sion by 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 773, § 99.05, at 1960 (effective Sept. 1, 1979).
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ment under the Texas Constitution. 527 The court rejected the state's argu-
ments and held it liable for holdover rentals as a tenant at will. The
constitutional provision allegedly prohibiting payment was deemed inap-
plicable to the facts at bar, because the legislature's appropriation of funds
for the commission's rental space within the holdover period was a preex-
isting law providing for the payment of rental. 528 The court extended to
the state level a rule that had previously been applied only to municipali-
ties and counties: a governmental entity receiving benefits that it was au-
thorized to contract for is liable for the reasonable value of the benefits,
notwithstanding the absence of a written contract.
529
3. Calculation of Gross Rental. Commercial landlords commonly con-
tract to receive rent payments based on a percentage of the tenant's gross
sales. Defining gross sales in this context can be difficult. The decision in
Henry S. Miller Realty Trust v. Bobby McGee's Conglomeration, Inc.
530
clarifies one element of this definition. In that case, the court construed a
lease provision that excluded "any sums collected and paid out for any
sales or excise tax" from the calculation of gross sales. The landlord ar-
gued that the gross receipts tax imposed on holders of mixed beverage per-
mits was not a sales or excise tax and was thus includable in gross sales.
The landlord contended that since the retailer did not directly assess its
customers for the mixed beverage tax53 1 as in the case of the sales tax,
532 it
was therefore a business expense of the permit holder. The court rejected
this distinction by reasoning that the mixed beverage tax was similar to a
sales tax, in that its cost was passed on to the consumer indirectly in the
retail price of the liquor served. The court also noted that percentage rent
is intended to reflect the economic benefits of doing business on the leased
premises, and any tax imposed by the state reduces the extent of these
economic benefits.
B. Security Deposits
In article 5236e 533 the Texas Legislature has provided relief for tenants
unable to recover security deposits. In Holloway v. Dannenmaier534 a ten-
ant sought relief under both article 5236e and the DTPA. 535 The trial
527. 578 S.W.2d at 158. The state relied on the applicability of art. III, § 44 of the Texas
Constitution, which provides in part: "The Legislature [shall not] grant, by appropriation or
otherwise, any amount of money out of the Treasury of the State, to any individual, on a
claim, . . . when the same shall not have been provided for by pre-existing law .
528. 578 S.W.2d at 160.
529. Id. at 160-61; see City of Houston v. Finn, 139 Tex. I11, 114, 161 S.W.2d 776, 777
(1942); Harris County v. Emmite, 554 S.W.2d 203, 204 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.]
1977, writ dism'd); Hayward v. City of Corpus Christi, 195 S.W.2d 995, 1004 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1946, writ refd n.r.e.).
530. 582 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
531. TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. art. 202.02 (Vernon 1978).
532. TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.021 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
533. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e (Vernon Supp. 1980).
534. 581 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ dism'd).
535. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.46(a), 17.46(b)(12), 17.50 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
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court denied the landlord's plea of privilege to be sued in Harris County,
and an appeal was taken from this denial. Although the plea of privilege
issue was apparently the only one before the court, the Holloway opinion
addressed the deceptive trade practices issue in a dictum that may be more
noteworthy than the holding on the venue issue.
The tenant contended that the lease provision regarding refund of secur-
ity deposits had deceived him into believing he had an absolute right to a
refund. The landlord claimed that the complaint failed to allege any facts
giving rise to a deceptive trade practices claim. Despite a lack of clarity in
the court's opinion, the Holloway court did attempt to define some limits
for a deceptive trade practices claim arising from a landlord's retention of
a security deposit. The court stated that failure to perform a promise is not
a misrepresentation but merely a breach of contract. Therefore, although
the lease recited that the landlord would refund the deposit if certain steps
were followed, and the landlord did not abide by his bargain, a deceptive
trade practices claim did not arise. The court suggested that to state a
deceptive trade practices claim, the tenant would be required to allege ei-
ther a pattern of the landlord in failing to refund deposits, or the landlord's
intention to keep the deposit at the time it was made.
Another security deposit case, Tammen v. Page,536 did not raise the
spectre of deceptive trade practices, but only involved article 5236e. The
trial court awarded damages to the tenant for the landlord's failure to re-
fund a security deposit. The landlord argued that the trial court had erred
in finding bad faith and in determining that the tenant had provided
proper notice of a forwarding address to the landlord. On appeal, the
Tammen court affirmed the trial court's specific finding that the landlord's
failure to provide the tenant with a written description of charges and
damages to be deducted from the security deposit had been done in bad
faith. 537 The only novel issue in Tammen was the sufficiency of the ten-
ant's forwarding address. Article 5236e538 requires a tenant to furnish a
written copy of a forwarding address to his landlord before the landlord is
obligated to return the tenant's security deposit. In Tammen, the tenant's
attorney wrote the landlord a demand letter requesting him to send the
deposit to the attorney's office. The landlord contended that this notice
was insufficient and that the tenant must personally supply the notice. The
court rejected this technical reading of the statute, and ruled that a tenant
may retain an agent for providing the statutory notice.5 39
C. Tenant's Delivery of Premises Upon Expiration of Lease Term
In Moren v. Pruske540 a landlord brought suit to recover for damages
suffered to leased premises during a tenant's occupancy. The issue before
536. 584 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, no writ).
537. See Wilson v. O'Connor, 555 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ
dism'd) for a full discussion of bad faith under art. 5236e.
538. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e, § 6(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
539. 584 S.W.2d at 917.
540. 570 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the court was the reasonableness of the damage estimates given at trial.
The court applied the rule that damages should be equal to the sum re-
quired to restore the property to its pre-tenant condition. The court found
sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's assessment that the
damage estimates were reasonable, and upheld the damages award.
A similar issue was presented in Winslar v. Barlett,54' in which a land-
lord brought an action to recover damages to property caused by a tenant.
The Winslar court, using similar logic and authorities 542 as the Moren
court, held the evidence sufficient to sustain the trial court's damage
award.543
D. Restrictive Covenants in Leases
The validity of exclusive dealings or restrictive use clauses was consid-
ered in two cases decided within the survey period. In Wettstein v. Love 544
a landlord sought payment of a tenant's past due taxes and rent.545 The
tenant answered that the landlord had breached the lease's restrictive use
clause by permitting other businesses to sell sandwiches on an adjacent
shopping center tract. The trial court submitted the case to the jury upon a
general charge, and the jury's answers to the special issues resulted in a
verdict for the tenant. The landlord argued that the trial court erred in
failing to grant his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The
Wettstein court noted that exclusive dealings clauses are generally valid
and run with the leased premises.546 Therefore, once the tenant alleged
violation of this clause, a question of fact resulted, and the landlord was
not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 547
The court in Berman v. City Products Corp. 548 voided a similar exclusive
dealings provision under the Texas antitrust statute. A group of people
acting collectively as the landlord joined in leasing a building to a tenant.
The lease contained a clause that prohibited the landlord from leasing any
building within 1000 feet of the leased premises to anyone conducting a
business similar to that of the tenant. One of the couples who acted as the
541. 573 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
542. See Pasadena State Bank v. Isaac, 149 Tex. 47, 228 S.W.2d 127 (1950); Stafford v.
Thornton, 420 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
543. 573 S.W.2d at 611.
544. 583 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
545. Certain lease clauses required the tenant to pay all taxes over a base year amount,
and also specified that rent payments were to be adjusted in accordance with the Consumer
Price Index. The landlord had failed to make periodic adjustments for these changes
throughout the lease term, until he suddenly made demand upon the tenant for the full
amount of past unadjusted rent and taxes.
546. 583 S.W.2d at 474. See also Karam v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 527 S.W.2d 481 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Neiman-Marcus Co. v. Hexter, 412 S.W.2d
915 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967, writ refd n.r.e.).
547. The court also held that the landlord's failure to give notice and collect the increases
in taxes and rents raised a fact issue as to whether the landlord had waived his rights to such
payments. 583 S.W.2d at 474. Landlords should give notice and collect any additional pay-
ments due under a lease to avoid any implication of a waiver of the right to collect such
sums. Id.
548. 579 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ granted).
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landlord owned another building within this 1000-foot radius and leased it
to a corporation that intended to compete with the tenant. The tenant
sought injunctive relief and damages resulting from the violation of the
lease's exclusive dealings provision. The landlord responded by arguing
that the exclusive dealings clause was null and void under Texas antitrust
laws.5
49
The Berman court focused on an exception to the antitrust laws that had
been developed in Schnitzer v. Southwestern Shoe Corp.,55° Karam v. HE.
Bult Grocery Co.,551 and Kroger Co. v. J Weingarten, Inc.5 52 Schnitzer
and Kroger dealt with situations in which individuals who had no "prop-
erty interest" in the restricted land had entered into restrictive land use or
exclusive dealings agreements and established the rule that such agree-
ments are valid only if all parties to the agreement held a "property inter-
est" in the affected land. 553 Karam established the converse of this rule;
that such agreements are valid if all restricting landowners possessed this
defined "property interest. '554 The Berman court reaffirmed the holdings
of these cases by holding the lease's exclusive dealings clause invalid. The
facts in Berman showed that two of the landlords had no interest in the
property, since the property was the separate property of their wives, who
retained sole management and control over it.
E. Landlord's Duty to Repair
The issue of a landlord's duty to repair the leased premises was the sub-
ject of several new developments within the survey period. In Rowlett v.
McMillan5 "5 the tenant sued for damages resulting when an intruder en-
tered her home and raped her. The tenant argued at trial that these events
were caused by the landlord's failure to replace a back door and to provide
the tenant with a safe place to live. The landlord requested and was
granted summary judgment, which was reversed on appeal. In reversing
the judgment, the Rowlett court noted that the tenant had raised two issues
that involved questions of fact, and thus, summary judgment was inappro-
priate. The issues raised were the existence of the landlord's duty to make
repairs and, if such a duty existed, the degree of care with which it was
discharged. The landlord argued that the lease contained an exculpatory
clause that negated the existence of a duty to repair. The appellate court,
however, correctly noted that the exculpatory clause argument was raised
for the first time on appeal and that affirmative defenses must be presented
in a defendant's answer.556
549. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.01-40 (Vernon 1968).
550. 364 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1963).
551. 527 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ refd n.r.e.).
552. 380 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1964, writ refd n.r.e.).
553. Kroger, 380 S.W.2d at 150; Schnitzer, 364 S.W.2d at 374. Texas courts have gener-
ally upheld the validity of restrictive use or exclusive dealings clauses between a single land-
lord and a single tenant.
554. 527 S.W.2d at 484.
555. 574 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
556. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 94.
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The survey period's most significant new development in Texas land-
lord-tenant law was the enactment of article 5236f, which also concerns the
landlord's duty to repair. Article 5236P 57 was passed in response to a 1978
supreme court decision, Kamarath v. Bennett,558 which created a Texas
common law implied warranty of habitability for tenants. The statute is
designed to define the scope and operation of the implied warranty. The
statute's complexity necessitates a section by section review. Section 1 con-
sists of definitions. The statute's application is limited by section 1(a) to
residential properties. Additionally, the statute specifies that a resident
manager or leasing agent is an appropriate agent for any notice to the
landlord required under the act.559 The manager or agent will not be con-
sidered the landlord for other purposes, however, unless he holds himself
out as such.560 Section 1(c) specifically extends a landlord's responsibili-
ties beyond any particular leased premises to all grounds and facilities held
out for a tenant's use.56'
A landlord's duty to repair is prescribed by section 2(a): "The landlord
shall have a duty upon actual notice as provided herein, to make a diligent
effort to repair or remedy any condition which materially affects the physi-
cal health or safety of an ordinary tenant."5 62 Sections 2(b) and (c) limit
this duty. Section 2(b) negates a duty to repair or remedy if the condition
is caused by a tenant or a tenant's family, guests, or invitees. This section
also requires a landlord to repair or remedy a condition which is caused by
normal wear and tear 563 if the condition materially affects the physical
health or safety of an ordinary tenant. Section 2(c) provides that a land-
lord is not required to furnish utilities from a utility company if, as a prac-
tical matter, the utility lines are not reasonably available. 564 Additionally,
this section specifies that a landlord is not required to furnish security
guards. A landlord's duty to repair or remedy does not extend to break-
age, malfunctions, or other conditions that do not materially affect the
health or safety of an ordinary tenant.5 65
Section 3 identifies the prerequisites that a tenant must satisfy before
exercising the rights and remedies of the act: (1) the tenant must give no-
tice at the place where rent is paid of a condition demanding repair (writ-
557. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5236f (Vernon Supp. 1980).
558. 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978).
559. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5236f, § I(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
560. Id.
561. Id. § l(c).
562. Id. § 2(a).
563. Normal wear and tear is defined in § 1(e) as
deterioration which occurs, based upon the use for which the rental unit is
intended, without negligence, carelessness, accident, or abuse of the premises
or equipment or chattels by the tenant or members of his household, or his
invitees or guests. Provided, however, "accident" shall not include breakage
or malfunction due to age or deteriorated condition.
Id. § 1(e).
564. The literal wording of this section is open to the interpretation that the landlord
does have an obligation to furnish utilities, even if not from a utility company.
565. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5236f, § 2(c) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
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ten notice is only required if specified in the lease); (2) the tenant must not
be delinquent in his rent; (3) the condition must "materially affect" the
physical health or safety of the ordinary tenant; (4) the landlord must have
failed to make a diligent effort to repair or remedy the condition; and (5)
the landlord must have a reasonable time after receipt of notice to repair
or remedy the condition, considering the extent of the problem and availa-
bility of materials, labor, and utilities for repair.5 66 The burden of proof in
a judicial enforcement that the first three requirements have been satisfied
rests with the tenant. As to the fourth and fifth requirements, the burden
will rest on the landlord if he fails to provide a written explanation for the
delay in correcting the condition within five days after a demand from the
tenant.
Section 4 provides for treatment of fire and casualty losses. Section 4(a)
specifies that if the condition needing repair results from an insured casu-
alty loss, a landlord is not required to commence repairs until the insur-
ance proceeds are received.5 67 Section 4(b) directs that if the premises are
"as a practical matter" totally unusable as a residence, upon written notice
any time before completion ofthe repairs, either party may cancel the lease,
in which case the tenant will receive a pro rata refund of rents.568 Section
4(c) provides that in a case of partial damage a tenant has a right to partial
rent reduction only upon application to the county or district court, but it
also allows the tenant and landlord to agree otherwise.5 69
Section 5 describes a nonjudicial remedy available to tenants. After the
prerequisites of section 3 have been met, and the tenant has served notice
to the landlord that he will terminate unless the condition is repaired or
remedied in seven days, a tenant may then terminate the lease.570 Section
6 outlines the judicial remedies available to a tenant. If a tenant complies
with all the prerequisites of section 3 and provides written notice that he
will file suit under the act if repairs are not made within seven days, the
tenant may seek any and all of the following:57' (a) a court order directing
the landlord to repair or remedy the condition; (b) a court order for partial
rent reduction; (c) a court order imposing a fine of one month's rent plus
$100; (d) a court order awarding actual damages to the tenant; and (e) a
court order assessing costs and attorney's fees against the landlord.5 72
Section 7 lists a variety of situations that will be presumed to constitute
retaliation by a landlord against a tenant for requesting repairs or exercis-
ing remedies under the act. Basically, a landlord may not, within six
months of a repair notice, do any of the following: file an eviction except
566. Id. § 3.
567. The statute lists fire, smoke, hail, and explosion, but these casualties should not be
considered exclusive. Id. § 4(a).
568. Sections 4(b) and (c) are only applicable if the loss was not due to tenant's negli-
gence or the negligence of his family, guests, or invitees.
569. The statute is silent on tenant's ability to terminate a lease for partial damage.
570. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5236f, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
571. The first two of the enumerated remedies, however, are unavailable if the tenant
terminates the rental agreement pursuant to § 5. Id. § 5(b).
572. Id. § 6.
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in specific instances;573 deprive the tenant of the use of the premises except
when authorized by law; decrease services to the tenant; give notice of ter-
mination of the lease; or increase the rent. A landlord may, however, as-
sert and prove the defense that his action was not a retaliation. It is not an
event of retaliation, for example, if rent is increased pursuant to a written
escalation clause for utilities, taxes, or insurance, or if rent is increased or
services reduced as part of an overall pattern in the complex. Retaliation
by a landlord results in a fine of one month's rent plus $100 and court,
attorney's, and tenant's moving costs.5 74 Section 8 provides that a landlord
is entitled to a civil penalty of one month's rent plus $100 if a tenant with-
holds rent in retaliation for a landlord's failure to make repairs. 575
Section 9 provides that except when the landlord's retaliatory motive
can be shown, failure to repair or remedy a condition is not a defense to an
eviction proceeding.5 76 Section 10 provides that the prevailing party in an
action authorized by the statute is entitled to attorney's fees, 577 while sec-
tion 11 recites that any bad faith lawsuit shall render the party prosecuting
such a claim liable for a civil penalty of one month's rent plus $100.578
Section 12 provides that a landlord may terminate the operation of the
rental property by giving notice to his tenants, a local health officer, and a
building inspector that he is terminating the lease as soon as legally possi-
ble, and stating that when the tenants move out, the landlord will either
demolish the unit or cease to rent it as residential property. If a landlord
sends such notice prior to receiving a repair notice from a tenant, the ten-
ant may not seek the remedies of the statute. If the landlord's notice is sent
after a repair notice is received but before a reasonable time for repair has
elapsed, the only remedy available to the complaining tenant is a pro rata
refund of rent and the landlord's payment of the tenant's moving ex-
penses.5 79 If the landlord sends such notice after receiving a notice to re-
pair and after a reasonable time to repair has elapsed, the complaining
tenant is entitled to exercise the remedies of section 6(c), (d), and (e) as
well. After notice of closing is received by the tenant, and after the tenant
moves out, local health officials and building inspectors may not permit
further occupancy or utility service to the rental unit until such official
certifies that there exists no condition known to him that materially affects
the physical health or safety of an ordinary tenant. 580
Section 13 is noteworthy in providing a simple means for avoiding the
act's requirements. This section provides that the rights created by the act
may be waived in a lease if the waiver language is underlined or in bold
print and the waiver is made knowingly, voluntarily, and for considera-
573. See § 7(b) of the act for a complete listing of circumstances in which an eviction is
authorized.
574. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5236f, § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
575. Id. § 8.
576. Id. § 9.
577. Id. § 10.
578. Id. § 11.




tion581 Such a waiver provision will likely become common in residential
leases. It is curious that the legislature has provided such a ready means
for emasculating the effect of its own intricately-crafted provisions.
Section 14 provides that the statute supersedes the common law regard-
ing landlord's warranties, duties of maintenance, repair, security, habita-
bility, and nonretaliation, and tenant's remedies for violations thereof.582
In other areas, the common law will remain unchanged, except where spe-
cifically contradicted.
F. Forcible Entry and Detainer Suits
In Buttery v. Bush583 the court reviewed the issue of a collateral effect of
a forcible entry and detainer judgment. In a forcible entry and detainer
action commenced by the landlord possession was awarded to the tenant.
The landlord then sought to have the lease declared void, and the tenant
raised the defense of res judicata based on her victory in the forcible entry
and detainer suit. The court held that since right to possession is the only
matter litigated in a forcible entry and detainer suit, the landlord's action
for declaratory judgment on the validity of the lease was not barred.5 84
G. Validity of Perpetual Leases
For the first time in fifty years585 the Texas court ruled on a perpetual
lease case. In Hull v. Quanah Pipeline Corp. 586 a landlord sought a declar-
atory judgment that a lease granting the tenant an "option to extend such
lease for an additional year and from year to year thereafter for the same
consideration and under the same terms and conditions as set forth [in the
original lease]"' 587 was enforceable for an additional one-year term only.
The trial court held the lease valid and enforceable as a perpetual lease.
The landlord's sole point of error was that the trial court erred in the con-
struction of the lease. The court of civil appeals upheld the trial court's
ruling on this issue, noting that although perpetual renewal rights have
never been favored by courts, they are enforceable if "unambiguously ex-
pressed" and not in violation of state laws and statutes.588 The court failed
to address, in any meaningful way, whether the option violated the Rule
Against Perpetuities. 589
581. Id. § 13.
582. Id. § 14.
583. 575 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
584. Id. at 146.
585. Pickrell v. Buckler, 293 S.W. 667 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1927, writ refd).
586. 574 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
587. Id. at 612.
588. Id.
589. The court did quote, with apparent approval, 50 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant
§ 1169 (1970), to the effect that a perpetual renewal does not violate the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities. 574 S.W.2d at 612.
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H. Tenant's Rights to Condemnation Proceeds
Colley v. Carleton590 addressed the extent of the tenant's right to receive
condemnation proceeds. The county condemned an avigation easement59'
and a commissioner's report awarded all damages to the fee owner. The
tenant's lease was for a fifty-year term, twenty-six years of which remained
at the time of condemnation. The tenant appealed to the district court for
a portion of the proceeds, but was again denied recovery. Interpreting the
governing condemnation statute, which provides that "the commissioners
shall estimate the injuries sustained and the benefits received thereby by
the owner,"592 the Corpus Christi court of civil appeals reversed, noting
that the word "owner" has been held to include a tenant.593 The court
reviewed the evidence, including the testimony of an appraiser, and con-
cluded that the tenant suffered significant damage from the condemnation.
The court remanded the case to the district court for a precise determina-
tion of the extent of the tenant's loss. The opinion did not evaluate the
validity of a lease provision that awards all condemnation proceeds to the
landlord.
VI. PRIVATE RESTRICTIONS ON LAND USE; MISCELLANEOUS CASES
AND LEGISLATION
A. Private Restrictions on Land Use
Four cases reported during the survey period involved restrictive cove-
nants in residential neighborhoods. In Bodenman v. Allandale Baptist
Church, Inc. 594 the plaintiff homeowners brought suit to enforce a cove-
nant restricting the use of a portion of the defendant church's property to
single family dwellings. The parties stipulated that for years the church
had used the lots in question for various church purposes, including park-
ing. The court of civil appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the plaintiffs' request for a temporary injunction be-
cause the stipulation raised the legal theory of waiver. The court reasoned
that in light of the parties' stipulation concerning the defendant's past use
of its lots, the issuance of a temporary injunction would actually have dis-
rupted, rather than preserved, the status quo pending trial on the merits.5 95
Another church defended a suit to enforce a restrictive covenant in Cal-
vary Baptist Church v. Adams.596 The plaintiff homeowners brought suit to
enjoin the church's construction of a driveway and parking facility on lots
restricted to residential use. The church appealed from the trial court's
grant of a temporary injunction on the grounds that (1) the action was not
ripe for litigation and did not present a justiciable controvery because the
590. 571 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).
591. Avigation easements are the airspace above land utilized for navigation of aircraft.
592. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3265, § 3 (Vernon 1968) (emphasis added).
593. Elliott v. Joseph, 163 Tex. 71, 351 S.W.2d 879 (1961).
594. 575 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ).
595. Id. at 354.
596. 570 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ).
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architectural control committee established by the covenanting landowners
had not yet taken any action relating to the proposed construction; (2) the
violation of the covenant was only prospective and speculative; (3) the
plaintiffs lacked the necessary proof to establish irreparable injury because
the breach of the covenant would render the lots unusable, in perpetuity,
for residential purposes; and (4) the plaintiffs failed to prove an affirmative
prospect of an actual and substantial injury sufficient to justify the issuance
of a temporary injunction. The court of civil appeals rejected all of these
contentions, holding that: (1) the restrictive covenant contemplated the
right of injunctive action by individual homeowners regardless of whether
any determination had first been made by the architectural control com-
mittee; (2) since the harm to plaintiffs was probable and threatened, they
were entitled to seek injunctive relief without first waiting for the harmful
result; (3) plaintiffs had sustained their burden to prove irreparable injury
because the church's proposed construction would substantially interfere
with the character of the residential lots in the subdivision; and (4) con-
struction of a driveway and parking facility would amount to just as sub-
stantial a violation of the restrictive covenant as if the church itself had
been constructed on the lots burdened with that covenant.5 97
In Park v. Baxter598 the plaintiff sued to enforce a restrictive covenant
limiting the use of the defendant's property to residential uses not consti-
tuting a nuisance. The trial court, sitting without a jury, held that the
cause of action was barred by the four-year statute of limitations applica-
ble to restrictive covenants.5 99 The plaintiff appealed, contending that
there was no evidence to support the trial court's finding that the statute
had run on his cause of action, or alternatively, that such a finding was
against the greater weight of the evidence. The plaintiff also argued that
the statute began to run only from the time when the plaintiff began to
suffer pecuniary loss as the result of the defendant's actions. The court of
civil appeals upheld the trial court, reasoning that the evidence, which in-
cluded testimony that an average of sixty students per month had attended
music lessons at the defendant's establishment more than four years prior
to the institution of suit, clearly showed that a business was being operated
on the defendant's property more than four years prior to the suit, and that
the plaintiff was or should have been aware of it.6°° Because the plaintiff
in an action to enforce a restrictive covenant need not prove actual dam-
ages to show a breach and obtain injunctive relief, the court further held
that the statute of limitations begins to run from the time that a substantial
breach occurs, not from the time when the plaintiff begins to suffer pecuni-
597. Id. at 472-75.
598. 572 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
599. Id. at 795. The applicable statute is TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5529 (Vernon
1958). See City of Fort Worth v. Johnson, 388 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. 1964); Schoenhals v. Close,
451 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970, no writ); Keene v. Reed, 340 S.W.2d 859
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1960, writ refd); Arrington v. Cleveland, 242 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1951, writ ref'd).
600. 572 S.W.2d at 795.
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The plaintiff in Knopf v. Standard Fixtures Co. 602 conveyed a portion of
its property through a deed containing a restrictive covenant that provided
that the tract would not be further "sold or leased to any business in direct
competition with" the plaintiff.60 3 The defendant acquired the property
from a subsequent grantee, and placed a sign thereon proclaiming it to be
the future home of a competitive business to which the defendant intended
to lease the property. The court of civil appeals upheld the trial court's
issuance of an injunction, holding that the actions of the defendant were
sufficient to demonstrate a substantial breach of the restrictive covenant.
The court also rejected the defendant's contention that the language of the
covenant did not restrict use of the property by a competitive business, but
only sale or lease of the property to a business that was, at the time of the
sale or lease, currently engaged in a business competing with the plain-
tiff.6 0 4
B. Miscellaneous
1. Joint Ventures. In Alischuler v. Cohen60 5 the plaintiffs, a sophisti-
cated group of investors, participated in the defendants' raw land syndica-
tion. The plaintiffs abandoned their investment in the joint venture while
the real estate market was depressed and brought suit against the defend-
ants, alleging material misrepresentations and nondisclosures on the part
of the defendants. The defendants counterclaimed, based on a threat by
one of the joint venturers to cloud title to the joint venture property and
thereby obbstruct continuation of the investment. The district court held
that the plaintiffs' loss occurred because they decided to abandon the ven-
ture at an inopportune time, rather than as the result of any material mis-
representations or nondisclosures attributable to the defendants. 60 6 The
court also found that information regarding the subject matter of the al-
leged misrepresentations and nondisclosures was at all material times
available to the plaintiffs, and that the principal material facts involved
were the value and potential of the land, which had not been misrepre-
sented.60 7 The court further held that the threat to cloud title to the ven-
ture property did not violate any cognizable legal duty, and thus did not
give rise to a cause of action favoring the defendants. This holding was
based on the fact that the venturer who made the threat notified all the
other venturers shortly thereafter that he would not carry it out, and be-
601. Id See Gunnels v. North Woodland Hills Community Ass'n, 563 S.W.2d 334, 337
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1978, no writ); Shepler v. Falk, 398 S.W.2d 151, 154
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1965, writ refd n.r.e.); Protestant Episcopal Church Council v.
McKinney, 339 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1960, writ refd).
602. 581 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
603. Id. at 505.
604. Id. at 506.
605. 471 F. Supp. 1372 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
606. Id. at 1373.
607. Id. at 1377-78.
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cause he in fact did not take any action to make his threat a reality.60 8
2. Valuation. The defendant taxpayer in City of Corpus Christi v.
Davis60 9 owned two tracts, separately assessed for taxes but included
under one tax account number. One tract, the "submerged land," was car-
ried on the tax roll at an assessed value of $400, and the other tract, "Block
B," was assigned an assessed value of $210,155. In 1974 the taxpayer ren-
dered the two tracts for the same total assessed value of $210,555, but in so
doing, rendered Block B at the lower value of $150,555 and rendered the
submerged land at the increased value of $60,000. Upon the taxpayer's
failure to pay taxes on the two tracts for the years 1973 through 1976, the
Corpus Christi taxing authorities filed suit. Prior to trial, however, plain-
tiffs amended the petition to exclude any prayer for recovery for delin-
quent taxes on the submerged land and to reduce the taxpayer's alleged
delinquent tax liability proportionately, based on the $400 assessed value
that the plaintiffs had ascribed to the submerged land. The trial court
based its award of delinquent taxes and penalties on Block B in an amount
less than that requested, upon an acceptance of the defendant's valuation
of $150,555. The court of civil appeals held that it was in error for the trial
court to award delinquent taxes on Block B for the year 1973 based on the
value rendered by the taxpayer in 1974.610 As to the years 1974 through
1976, however, the plaintiff taxing authorities were held to be bound by the
taxpayer's division and assignment of value in his 1974 rendition, because
the Board of Equalization had accepted the defendant's rendition in 1974,
and did not notify him of any proposed increase in valuation for the years
1974 through 1976.611
3. Legislation. Two recent legislative measures are clearly designed to
encourage individual initiative toward public policy goals. For example,
individuals are aided in eliminating the fire hazard represented by the use
of wood shingles by H.B. 1625, effective August 27, 1979, which voids all
deed restrictions applicable to structures on residential property that re-
quire the use of wood shingle roofs.6 12 Individual initiative toward inno-
vative energy alternatives is encouraged by S.B. 204, effective January 1,
1980, which exempts property value resulting from the construction or in-
stallation of any solar or wind energy collector or storage mechanism pri-
marily for on-site use from all property taxes levied by the state or any
political subdivision of the state.613
One of the most significant pieces of legislation affecting real property
enacted within the survey period is S.B. 621, effective August 27, 1979,
which represents a comprehensive and far-reaching reorganization of state
608. Id. at 1379.
609. 575 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).
610. Id. at 52-53.
611. Id. at 54.
612. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1293c (Vernon Supp. 1980).
613. Id. art. 7150.1.
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property tax statutes.61 4 Although a comprehensive discussion of this
lengthy statute is not within the scope of this article, a few of its most
noteworthy provisions will be mentioned. For instance, an appraisal dis-
trict is established in each county, responsible for appraising property in
the district for ad valorem tax purposes both of the state and each taxing
unit other than the county that imposes ad valorem taxes on property in
the district. In addition, a newly-created State Property Tax Board will
establish "minimum standards for the administration and operation of an
appraisal district and a county assessor-collector's office" in order to pro-
vide uniformity in the administration of the property taxation laws of all
the different jurisdictions. 6 15 The act also institutes certain measures
designed to facilitate the process of taxpayer appeals.
A related bill, H.J.R. 98, represents a proposed amendment to article
VIII, section 18 of the Texas Constitution, and will be submitted to the
voters at an election to be held November 4, 1980.616 If the amendment is
approved by the voters, it will require a single board of equalization in
each county as well as a "single appraisal within each county of all prop-
erty subject to ad valorem taxation by the county and all other taxing units
located therein. '61 7 If the amendment is not approved, county govern-
ments will be allowed to continue their own separate appraisal activities.
House Bill 1060, effective in part May 31, 1979, the remainder effective
January 1, 1980, implements the tax relief amendment to the Texas Consti-
tution approved in November 1978.618 Its various articles affect the ap-
praisal of agricultural and timber land, exempt intangible property,
household goods and personal effects that are not held or used for the pro-
duction of income, and automobiles from ad valorem taxation, affect the
residential homestead exemptions, and provide for state payments to re-
place school taxes lost because of the state-mandated reduction of the ad
valorem tax base.
Tax-related definitions are affected by S.B. 1035, effective August 27,
1979, which amends article 7146 to provide that "mobile homes" are to be
deemed personal property for the purpose of enforcement of tax liens, and
to exclude "trailers" from the definition of real property for the purpose of
taxation. 6
1 9
Another legislative act pertinent to the tax assessment process is S.B.
592, effective May 9, 1979, which amends article 7244b to provide that
assessing property for tax purposes without registering with the Board of
Tax Assessor Examiners shall constitute a class C misdemeanor rather
than a class A misdemeanor. 620
614. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 841, §§ 1-43, at 2217-2332.
615. Id. § 1, at 221.
616. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, §§ 1-2, at 3229.
617. Id.
618. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 302, at 680-99.
619. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 7146, 7298 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
620. Id. art. 7244b.
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